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TERRIBLE TO UHY: NAVIGATING JUDICIAL REVIEW OF
AN AGENCY'S RESPONSE TO THIRD-PARTY SUBPOENAS
Zoe Nieselt

The question of judicial review of a federal agency's response to a third-party
subpoena is highly litigated,and yet barely addressedin academic literature.Forseventy
years, this issue has beengoverned by the Supreme Court'sholding in United States ex rel.
Touhy v. Ragen, a case that spawned its own vocabulary, its own legal doctrine, and its
own circuit split. The confusion has left four circuit courts entrenched, the remainder
waffling and the district courts largely on their own to sort out a workable standard.
This Article establishes that the circuit courts' approaches to judicial review of an
agency's noncompliance with a subpoena are largely divided over the academic question
of sovereign immunity. For the Fourth and Eleventh Circuits, only the Administrative
ProcedureAct (APA) provides the necessary waiver of sovereign immunity that allows a
court to review agency action; accordingly,review ofan agency'sfailure to comply with a
subpoena is analyzed under the APA's "arbitraryand capricious"standard.Forthe Ninth
and D.C. Circuits, the ftderal courts have broad, implicit power over discovery, and
FederalRule of Civil Procedure45 is applied as it would be in all other cases. This Article
seeks to reconcile these competing lines ofauthoritybyproposing that the APA's waiver of
sovereign immunity still applies when an agency runs afoul of discovery standards
contained in FederalRule 45.
This Article attempts to reunite the circuits because districtcourt case law shows that
confusion over the appropriatestandardis a "distinction without a difference." For lower
courts and litigants attempting to navigate the circuit split, it is worth knowing that the
question largely comes down to the impact third-party subpoenas have on agency time,
money, and statutory mission. By framingjudicial review accordingly, consistent results
can be achieved despite the geographiclocation of the court.

t Zoe Niesel is an Assistant Professor at St. Mary's University School of Law. She previously served
as a Visiting Assistant Professor at Wake Forest University School of Law.
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INTRODUCTION

The term Touhyl is one of many meanings. Birthed by a Supreme
Court case of the same name, United States ex rel. Touhy v. Ragen,2 "Touhy"
can refer to the case itself, a certain type of federal administrative regulation,3

The litigant who started it all, Roger Touhy, was an infamous Chicago crime boss who went by
the nickname "Touhy the Terrible." He was best known for two things-his rivalry with Al Capone,
and a faked kidnapping of fellow gangster "Jake the Barber" Factor. See Roger "The Terrible" Touhy,
FBI.GOv, https://www.fbi.gov/history/famous-cases/roger-the-terrible-touhy [https://perma.cc/39LJLMEY]; David Wallechinsky & Irving Wallace, Biography of Gangsters Roger the Terrible Touhy,
TRIVIA- LIBRARY.COM, https://www.trivia-library.com/c/biography-of-gangsters- roger-the-terribletouhy.htm [https://perma.cc/6Y9C- H26D].
2 United States ex rel. Touhy v. Ragen, 340 U.S. 462 (1951).
3 United States ex rel. Pogue v. Diabetes Treatment Ctrs. of Am., 474 F. Supp. 2d 75, 79 (D.D.C.
2007) ("[A] federal agency may adopt procedures- dubbed Touhy regulations after the Supreme Court
decision United States ex rel. Touhy v. Ragen-for responding to subpoenas and other requests for
testimony or documents.").
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a legal doctrine,4 or a circuit split5 that continues to confound litigants and
district courts.
Ultimately, trouble with Touhy comes down to seven decades of
confusion surrounding how courts should review a federal agency's refusal
to allow the production of documents or employee testimony under a thirdparty subpoena. In these situations, private litigants, in cases to which the
United States is not a party, seek to subpoena documents or employee
testimony from a federal agency-sometimes to acquire facts held in agency
records,6 and sometimes to bootstrap a taxpayer-funded expert witness.7
When this happens, federal agencies turn their attention to the Federal
Housekeeping Statute (Housekeeping Statute) at 5 U.S.C. § 301, which
allows agencies to promulgate internal regulations that govern the "custody,
use, and preservation" of documents, or the "conduct of its employees."8
Under § 301, many agencies have promulgated what are now called "Touhy
regulations," which disallow federal employees from answering third-party
subpoenas without the permission of certain agency officials.9 Those
designated officials then use balancing tests that examine the agency's
resources, mission, and government neutrality in light of the requested
information in acquiescing to, or demurring from, the subpoena. 10

4 Quezada v. Mink, No. 10-cv-00879-REB-KLM, 2010 WL 4537086, at *3 (D. Colo.Nov. 3, 2010)
("[Tlhere is little room to doubt that the [Touhy] doctrine is alive and well here.").
5 See, e.g., Solomon v. Nassau Cty., 274 F.R.D. 455, 458 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (collecting cases); In re
Packaged Ice Antitrust Litig., No. 08-md-01952, 2011 WL 1790189, at *2 (E.D. Mich. May 10, 2011)
(collecting cases).
6 Exxon Shipping Co. v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, 34 F.3d 774, 779 (9th Cir. 1994) ("[T]he National
Weather Service alone receives hundreds of requests a year from private litigants seeking to introduce
evidence about weather patterns in cases as routine as minor car accidents.").
7 Benhoff v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, No. 16CV 1095-GPC(JLB), 2017 WL 840879, at *5 (S.D. Cal.
Mar. 3, 2017) (showing documents that the litigant was requesting were more suitable for an
investigator or expert witness than using federal taxpayer dollars to support agency employee
involvement in private litigation).

8 5 U.S.C. § 301 (2018).
9 The Department of Health and Human Services' (HHS) Touhy regulations state that "[nlo
employee or former employee" of HHS "may provide testimony or produce documents in any
proceedings.., concerning information acquired in the course of performing official duties.. . unless
" 45 C.F.R. § 2.3 (2020); see also United States ex rel. Pogue v.
authorized by the Agency head ....
Diabetes Treatment Ctrs. of Am., 474 F. Supp. 2d 75, 79 (D.D.C. 2007) (discussing HHS's Touhy
scheme).
ioSee, e.g., 43 C.F.R. § 2.288(a), (c) (2020) (representing factors considered by the Bureau of Land
Management).
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After an agency reaches a decision under its Touhy regulations, the
question ofjudicial review becomes one of an entrenched circuit split." The
Fourth and Eleventh Circuits currently assess an agency's decision under its
Touhy regulations using the arbitrary and capricious standard set forth in
2
§ 706 of the APA-a standard that is largely deferential to the agency.
Under this standard, a "court is not.., to substitute its judgment for that of
the agency" but rather "must consider whether the decision was based on a
consideration of the relevant factors and whether there has been a clear error
of judgment."13
In contrast, the Ninth and D.C. Circuits utilize the "requester-friendly"
standard found in Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 45 and 26, also referred
to as the "undue burden" standard.'4 Pursuant to the two Federal Rules,
courts "determine whether it would be an undue burden for the government
to produce the requested employees, and to weigh that burden against the
[p]laintiffs need for the testimony."15 The decision on whether to compel
the agency's compliance remains in the discretion of the district court. 6
Although not obvious, the ultimate confusion over the use of one of these
standards, versus the other, is rooted in how a federal agency waives
sovereign immunity before submitting to a federal court's subpoena.17

ii Agility Pub. Warehousing Co. K.S.C.P. v. U.S. Dep't of Def., 246 F. Supp. 3d 34,41 n.7 (D.D.C.
2017) (discussing the existence of a circuit split).
12 See, e.g., Meisel v. FBI, 204 F. Supp. 2d 684,689-90 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (analyzing an agency's refusal
to comply with a non-party subpoena only pursuant to the APA).
13 Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 285 (1974) (internal
quotation mark and citation omitted).
14 See Anwar v. Fairfield Greenwich Ltd., 297 F.R.D. 223, 226 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (applying the
requester-friendly standard set forth in Rule 45"); In re PE Corp. Sec. Litig., No. 3:00 CV 705 CFD TPS,
2005 WL 806719, at *7(D. Conn. Apr. 8, 2005) (applying the standard set forth in the Federal Rules).
1s Solomon v. Nassau Cty., 274 F.R.D. 455, 458 (E.D.N.Y.2011); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(1)
(permitting a court to issue an order protecting a "party or person" from "undue burden or expense" in
connection with a discovery request); FED. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(1) ("A party or attorney responsible for
issuing and serving a subpoena must take reasonable steps to avoid imposing undue burden or expense

on a person subject to the subpoena. The court for the district where compliance is required must
enforce this duty. ..."); Anwar, 297 F.R.D. at 226 ("[T]he Court must 'balance the interests served by
demanding compliance with the subpoena against the interests furthered by quashing it' (quoting
Aristocrat Leisure Ltd. v. Deutsche Bank Tr. Co. Ams., 262 F.R.D 293, 300 (S.D.N.Y. 2009))).
16 See In re Fitch, Inc., 330 F.3d 104, 108 (2d Cir. 2003) ("Motions to compel and motions to quash
a subpoena are both 'entrusted to the sound discretion of the district court."' (quoting United States v.

Sanders, 211 F.3d 711,720 (2d Cir. 2000))).
17 See Joseph v. Fluor Corp., No. 10-379, 2010 WL 797840, at *2 (E.D. La. Mar. 2,2010) ("Although
Touhy does not specifically discuss sovereign immunity, it is easy to see how the concept ties in ....
").
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In three Parts, this Article breaks down and reconstructs the
complicated framework that surrounds third-party subpoenas served on
federal administrative agencies. Part I assesses the Supreme Court's holding
in the Touhy case and the various iterations that "Touhy regulations" have
taken in federal agencies. Part II explores the existing circuit split that
governs how courts assess an agency's refusal to comply with a third-party
subpoena. What becomes clear from this analysis is that the various
approaches are ultimately rooted in considerations of sovereign immunity.
The Fourth and Eleventh Circuits apply a deferential standard from the
statutory language of the APA to the question of third-party subpoenas on
the basis that only the APA contains a valid waiver of sovereign immunity
in this context. In contrast, the Ninth Circuit and D.C. Circuit eschew
sovereign immunity when a federal court is summoning a federal employee,
and instead ask their lower courts to apply the "undue burden" standard
from Federal Rule 45.
Part III examines the decisions made by district courts on the question
of third-party subpoenas served on administrative agencies. From an
analysis of the district court case law, at least one thing becomes clear: All
district courts are essentially weighing the same considerations-a
subpoena's impact on agency time and money, and any impact on the
agency's statutory mission. Accordingly, Part III of this Article proposes a
manner of reconciling the two approaches and reading them together by
applying the APA's waiver of sovereign immunity while still using the
analytical framework of Federal Rule 45.
The analysis proposed by this Article seeks to do two things. First,
establish that the district courts are essentially looking to the same
considerations, despite the standard of judicial review approach. Second,
reconcile the question of sovereign immunity in the current circuit split.
Under either theory, the question of sovereign immunity can be easily
answered by the APA. As such, the proper standard to be applied should be
Federal Rule 45, placing agencies on the same procedural ground as all nonparties summoned to outside litigation while still protecting the
government's interest in preserving resources and fulfilling a public mission.
I. THE TOUHYNOMENCLATURE-DOCTRINE AND REGULATIONS
"United States ex rel. Touhy v. Ragen is part of an unbroken line of
authority which... [holds] that a federal employee may not be compelled to
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testify contrary to his federal employer's instructions under valid agency
regulations."'8 The Touhy case not only birthed this line of legal doctrine, but
also its own terminology (and, ultimately, its own circuit split on
application).
The circumstances that gave rise to the Touhy doctrine are relatively
straightforward. Roger Touhy was an inmate in an Illinois state penitentiary,
and he brought a habeas corpus proceeding alleging his imprisonment
violated the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause.19 In the course of the
habeas proceedings, a subpoena duces tecum was served on a Federal Bureau
of Investigation (FBI) agent that required the FBI to produce records that
Mr. Touhy claimed showed that his conviction was fraudulent.20 After being
placed on the witness stand and ordered by the court to comply with the
subpoena, the FBI agent refused to produce the records stating, "I must
respectfully advise the Court that under instructions to me by the Attorney
General that I must respectfully decline to produce them, in accordance with
Department Rule No. 3229."21
The department rule to which the FBI agent was referring was
Department of Justice (DOJ) Order No. 3229, which was originally issued
by the DOJ in 1946. Pursuant to that rule:
All official files, documents, records and information in the
offices of the Department of Justice, including the... Federal
Bureau of Investigation.... are to be regarded as confidential. No
officer or employee may permit the disclosure or use of the same
for any purpose other than for the performance of his official
duties, except in the discretion of the Attorney General....
Whenever a subpoena duces tecum is served to produce any of
such files,... the officer or employee on whom such subpoena is
served, unless otherwise expressly directed by the Attorney
General, will appear in court in answer thereto and respectfully
decline to produce the records specified there in, on the ground

18

Smith v. Cromer, 159 F.3d 875, 879 (4th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted).

ig United States ex rel. Touhy v. Ragen, 340 U.S. 462,463-64 (1951).
20

Id. at 464-65.

21

Id. at 465.
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that the disclosure of such records is prohibited by this
regulation.22

22 Id. at 463 n. 1.DOJ regulations concerning employees' responses to subpoenas duces tecum were
found at 11 Fed. Reg. 4920 at the time of the Touhy case. Today, similar regulations for DOJ officials,
including FBI agents, are located in the Code of Federal Regulations, Part 16, Subpart B, Section 16.22,
which gives the general prohibition on employees producing documents in either federal or state
proceedings to which the United States is not a party. See id.; see also 28 C.F.R. § 16.22 (2020). The
relevant parts of that regulation are as follows:

In any federal or state case or matter in which the United States is not a party, no employee
or former employee of the Department of Justice shall, in response to a demand, produce
any material contained in the files of the Department, or disclose any information relating
to or based upon material contained in the files of the Department, or disclose any
information or produce any material acquired as part of the performance of that person's
official duties or because of that person's official status without prior approval of the proper
Department official.
Id. When an employee does receive a subpoena for documents or oral testimony, the employee must
notify the U.S. Attorney for the district of the issuing authority. Id. If a party to a legal proceeding is
demanding the oral testimony of a DOJ employee:
[A]n affidavit, or, if that is not feasible, a statement by the party seeking the testimony or by
his attorney, setting forth a summary of the testimony sought and its relevance to the
proceeding, must be furnished to the responsible U.S. Attorney. Any authorization for
testimony by a present or former employee of the Department shall be limited to the scope
of the demand as summarized in such statement.
Id. In determining whether to produce the documents, the U.S. Attorney should employ a balancing
test of factors. See id. § 16.26. The U.S. Attorney should consider: (1) whether disclosure is appropriate
under the relevant case's rules of procedure; and (2) whether disclosure is appropriate after considering
the substantive law of privilege. Id. Additionally, the U.S. Attorney will not allow production or
disclosure if any of the following factors are found:
(1) Disclosure would violate a statute, such as the income tax laws...;
(2) Disclosure would violate a specific regulation;
(3) Disclosure would reveal classified information ...
(4) Disclosure would reveal a confidential source or informant...;
(5) Disclosure would reveal investigatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes,
and would interfere with enforcement proceedings or disclose investigative techniques and
procedures the effectiveness of which would thereby be impaired; [and]
(6) Disclosure would improperly reveal trade secrets without the owner's consent.
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Regulations like DOJ Order No. 3229 are products of the
Housekeeping Statute,23 5 U.S.C. § 301. Pursuant to the Housekeeping
Statute, an agency like the DOJ can pass regulations relating to "the conduct
of its employees, the distribution and performance of its business, and the
custody, use, and preservation of its records, papers, and property."24
In Touhy, the FBI agent in question, by following DOJ Order No. 3229,
found himself in contempt of court and sentenced to the custody of the
Attorney General of the United States after using the DOJ housekeeping
regulations as a defense for failing to obey the subpoena duces tecum. 25 The
circuit court reversed, and the issue reached the Supreme Court to
determine "whether it is permissible for the Attorney General to make a
conclusive determination not to produce records and whether his
subordinates in accordance with the order may lawfully decline to produce
them in response to a subpoena duces tecum."26
The Court began its analysis by noting that the question of the Attorney
General's power to refuse to turn over papers in his possession was an
unnecessary one-the man before the court in this instance was the Attorney
General's subordinate, not the Attorney General himself.27 As such, the
Court considered only whether a refusal by the Attorney General's
subordinate to comply with the subpoena duces tecum was appropriate in
light of DOJ Order No. 3229, which prohibited the subordinate from
answering the subpoena without the permission of the Attorney General. As
such, the question was whether DOJ Order No. 3229 could in fact validly
withdraw the subordinate's power to comply with the court's subpoena.28

23 See Puerto Rico v. United States, 490 F.3d 50, 61(st Cir. 2007) ("Under the Housekeeping Act,
5 U.S.C. § 301, federal agencies may promulgate regulations establishing conditions for the disclosure
of information."); Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281,283 (1979) ("Section 301 is a 'housekeeping
statute,' authorizing rules of agency organization, procedure, or prac.tice as opposed to 'substantive
rules."'). The original housekeeping statute was passed in 1789 as a means "to help General Washington
get his administration underway by spelling out the authority for executive officials to set up offices and
file Government documents." Exxon Shipping Co. v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, 34 F.3d 774, 777 (9th Cir.
1994) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 85-1461 (1958), as reprintedin 1958 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3352, 3352).
24

5 U.S.C. § 301 (2018).

25

Touhy, 340 U.S. at 465.

26

Id. at 465-67.

Id. at 467. The Court left for another time the question of whether the Attorney General himself
could refuse, after a court request, to produce the papers. Id.
27

28

Id.
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The Court also noted that the Housekeeping Statute, which allowed the
promulgation of DOJ Order No. 3229, was rooted in valid concerns about
government efficiency and management-particularly "[wihen one
considers the variety of information contained in the files of any government
department and the possibilities of harm from unrestricted disclosure in
court, the usefulness, indeed the necessity, of centralizing determination as
to whether subpoenas duces tecum will be willingly obeyed or challenged is
obvious."29 As such, the Attorney General had statutory authority to
prescribe regulations that would govern the preservation and use of agency
documents.30 Subordinate executive officers could thus not be held in
contempt when they refused to comply with a subpoena in reliance on valid
internal agency housekeeping regulations. The DOJ's regulations took on
31
the name "Touhy regulations" in honor of the watershed case.
The Touhy regulations for the DOJ continue to be litigated, but
ultimately the same result continues to be reached. For example, in Smith v.
Cromer, the Fourth Circuit addressed a case in which the defendant (who
was facing drug charges in Maryland) subpoenaed two Assistant U.S.
Attorneys and an agent of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA).32
The defendant was attempting to compel the testimony of these individuals,
as well as the production of documents from when he served as a DEA

Id.

29

3o The Court looked to additional precedent for its holding-Boske v. Corningore, 177 U.S. 459

(1900). In that case, Department of the Treasury regulations prohibited an internal revenue collector
from producing records in his possession for a state court proceeding. Id. at 460-61. The Court held
that there was appropriate authority in the Secretary of the Treasury under the Housekeeping Statute
to allow regulations that centralized the production of documents with the head of the agency:
Can it be said that to invest the Secretary of the Treasury with authority to prescribe
regulations ... for the conduct of the business of his department, and to provide for the
custody, use, and preservation of the records, papers.. . appertaining to it, was not a means
appropriate and plainly adapted to the successful administration of the affairs of that
department? Manifestly not.
Id. at 469.
31 In re Packaged Ice Antitrust Litig. No. 08-md-01952, 2011 WL 1790189, at *3 n.2 (E.D. Mich.
May 10, 2011) ("These DOJ regulations, similar to those of other federal agencies, internally control the
manner in which the DOJ responds to subpoena requests for documents and information. The
regulations derive their name from United States ex rel. Touhy v. Ragen .....
32

Smith v. Cromer, 159 F.3d 875, 877 (4th Cir. 1998).
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informant, to defend against state narcotics charges.33 The DOJ resisted the
production of the file and the testimony of its employees, and was granted a
protective order after the action was removed to the federal court. 34
On review in the Fourth Circuit, the court noted that based on
principles of sovereign immunity, the state court could not enforce the
subpoenas.35 The relevant DOJ Touhy regulations, including 28 C.F.R.
§ 16.22, prohibited employees from disclosing information in proceedings
in which the United States is not a party without prior approval from the
proper official and in the manner specified by the regulations.36
The Touhy case birthed an entire nomenclature. "Touhy regulations"
exist for nearly all federal agencies, and usually have a few main features: (1)
a general prohibition against subordinate employees producing documents
or appearing for oral testimony without permission from a superior officer
or executive agency head;37 (2) a process for formally requesting, in writing,
agency documents or testimony sought by a litigant;38 and (3) a procedure

33 Id. (explaining the defendant had served as a DEA confidential informant for just over a year
before being indicted for delivering heroin to a state informant).

3

Id.

35

Id. at 881.

36

Id.; see also 28 C.F.R. § 16.22 (2020).

See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. § 2.3 (2020). This section comes from the Department of Health and Human
Services' Touhy regulations and states:
37

No employee or former employee of the DHHS may provide testimony or produce
documents in any proceedings to which this part applies concerning information acquired
in the course of performing official duties or because of the person's official relationship with
the Department unless authorized by the Agency head pursuant to this part based on a
determination by the Agency head, after consultation with the Office of the General
Counsel, that compliance with the request would promote the objectives of the Department.
Id. The Department of Energy's Touhy regulations are similar:
No employee or former employee of the DOE shall, in response to a demand of a court or
other authority, produce any material contained in the file of the DOE or disclose any
information relating to material contained in the files of the DOE, or disclose any
information or produce any material acquired as part of the performance of his official
duties or because of his official status without prior approval of the General Counsel of DOE.
10 C.F.R. § 202.22 (2020).
38

For example, HHS requires:

All requests for testimony by an employee or former employee of the DHHS in his or her
official capacity ... must be addressed to the Agency head in writing and must state the
nature of the requested testimony, why the information sought is unavailable by any other
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for the agency's review of the request. 39 The procedure for review often
involves a combination of factors, or a balancing test, that the agency is to
consider in accepting or denying the request; unsurprisingly, this balancing
test usually centers on the interests of the agency and the public.40 Parties
seeking information from federal agencies must follow these steps, and
exhaust the process, before challenging the agency in court.41
A typical Touhy scheme comes from the U.S. Department of
Agriculture (USDA). Touhy regulations for the USDA are contained at Title
7 of the Code of Federal Regulations. Within 7 C.F.R. § 1.212, the agency
states that "[n]o USDA employee may provide testimony or produce
documents in a judicial or administrative proceeding unless authorized in
accordance with this subpart."42 Such is an example of the general
prohibition against agency employees testifying or producing documents
without following standard agency procedure.
Section 1.214 then spells out the exact procedure that is to be followed
when an employee of USDA is served with a summons or subpoena
demanding her appearance in a judicial proceeding to which the United
States is not a party. 43 Pursuant to this section, employees who receive such
summons or subpoenas are required to notify the agency head of the

means, and the reasons why the testimony would be in the interest of the DHHS or the
federal government.
45 C.F.R. § 2.4 (2020). For a discussion of a requesting party's failure to follow the proper steps under a
Touhy scheme, see Manzo v. Stanley Black & Decker, Inc., No. 13-CV-3963 (JFB) (SIL), 2017 WL
1194651, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2017).
39

See 6 C.F.R. § 5.48 (2020) (listing Department of Homeland Security procedures).

See, e.g., 38 C.F.R. § 14.804. This section lists the factors that will be considered when the
Department of Veteran's Affairs considers a request under its Touhy regulations. Those factors include:
40

(a) The need to avoid spending the time and money of the United States for private purposes
and to conserve the time of VA personnel for conducting their official duties concerning
servicing the Nation's veteran population; (b) How the testimony or production of records
would assist VA in performing its statutory duties; (c) Whether the disclosure of the records
or presentation of testimony is necessary to prevent the perpetration of fraud or other
injustice in the matter in question; [and] (d) Whether the demand or request is unduly
burdensome or otherwise inappropriate under the applicable court or administrative rules.
Id.
41

United States ex rel. Pogue v. Diabetes Treatment Ctrs. ofAm., 474 F. Supp. 2d 75,79-80 (D.D.C.

2007).
42

7C.F.R. § 1.212 (2020).

43

Id. § 1.214.
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existence and nature of the order, and must await permission from the
agency head before obeying the order.44 If the appearance is not authorized
by the agency head, the employee should appear at the stated time and place
of the hearing, produce a copy of the relevant Touhy regulations, and
respectfully decline to testify (much like was done by the FBI agent in Touhy
itself) .45 To determine whether the employee should decline to comply with
the order, the agency head, in consultation with the USDA General Counsel,
will consider whether the appearance would be in the "interests of the
employee and USDA."46 The agency head will consider, among any other
items: (1) "what interest of USDA would be promoted by the employee's
testimony;" (2) "whether an appearance would result in an unnecessary
interference with the duties of the USDA employee;" and (3) "whether an
employee's testimony would result in the appearance of improperly favoring
one litigant over another."47
Sierra Pacific Industries v. United States Department of Agriculture48
represents a fairly typical third-party subpoena case handled under USDA's
Touhy regulations. The underlying litigants sued each other in a state court
case relating to forest fires that occurred in 2007. One of the litigants
attempted to subpoena documents and witnesses from USDA relating to the
state court action, and the USDA refused to comply on the basis of its Touhy
regulations.49 In refusing to allow the state court litigants access to its
employees, the USDA argued (using the factors found at 7 C.F.R. § 1.214),
that: (1) depositions and testimony of employees would take time away from
their official duties; (2) testimony would create the appearance of favoring
one litigant over the other; and (3) testimony in the state court action would
50
be cumulative to testimony occurring in a related federal court action.
Interestingly, it is difficult to imagine a situation in which agency employees
were requested as witnesses where such a request did not implicate their time

44

Id.

45 Id. § 1.214(c). Under USDA's Touhy regulations, the request is then handled as a Freedom of
Information Act request. Id. § 1.215(a).
46

Id. § 1.214(c).

47

Id. § 1.214(e).

48

No. CIV S- 11-1250 KJM EFB, 2011 WL 6749837, at * 1 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 22,2011).

49

Id.

5o Id. The court ended up denying the state court litigants' request for documents with respect to
some items but allowing the request for three letters exchanged between the U.S. Attorney's Office and
the plaintiffs on which USDA was copied. Id. at *6.
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on the job, suggesting that the first factor will always lean in favor of the
agency.
The doctrine articulated first in Touhy has been expanded in a litany of
case law outside the regulations of the DOJ. For example, the Department of
Housing and Urban Development's Touhy regulations were discussed in
CaIjeff,LLC v. A.M.E. Services, Inc.5' while USDA's Touhy regulations were
discussed in In re Elko County GrandJury.52 To date, Touhy and its named
regulations present one of the most frustrating challenges to litigators
attempting to finesse information from the federal government.

II.

THE CIRCUIT SPLIT-A QUESTION OF SOVEREIGN

IMMUNITY

Judicial review of third-party discovery from federal administrative
agencies is the subject of a circuit split that causes outcomes to vary by
geography.53 The Fourth54 and Eleventhss Circuits adopt a deferential
standard that analyzes an agency's decision to withhold information or
testimony under its Touhy regulations by assessing whether the decision was
"arbitrary or capricious" under the APA. This standard is more likely to
result in the agency withholding information requested in a third-party
subpoena. In contrast, the Ninth56 and D.C.57 Circuits have held that, for a
federal court requesting testimony or documents from a federal agency, the
standards of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45 govern.

s No. 08-4789, 2008 WL 5427637, at * 1 (E.D. La. Dec. 30, 2008).
In re Elko Cty. Grand Jury, 109 F.3d 554, 556 (9th Cir. 1997); see also Davis Enterprises v. EPA,
877 F.2d 1181, 1184 (3d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1070 (1990) (Environmental Protection
Agency); Swett v. Schenk, 792 F.2d 1447, 1452 (9th Cir. 1986) (National Transportation Safety Board);
Gizav. Sec'y of Health, Ed. & Welfare, 628 F.2d 748,751 (1st Cir. 1980) (Health Education and Welfare).
53 See Quiles v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., No. 8:16CV330, 2018 WL 734172, at *1(D. Neb. Feb. 6,2018),
affd, No. 8:16CV330, 2018 WL 2148979 (D. Neb. May 10, 2018) ("Circuit courts are split regarding the
appropriate standard to use when determining whether a federal agency has properly refused to comply
with a third-party subpoena."); Agility Pub. Warehousing Co. K.S.C.P. v. U.S. Dep't of Def., 246 F. Supp.
3d 34, 41 n.7 (D.D.C. 2017) ("There appears to be a circuit split-or at least confusion-about whether
Rule 45 or the APA should govern a court's review in the case of a federal court litigant.").
52

54

See COMSAT Corp. v. Nat'l Sci. Found., 190 F.3d 269,278 (4th Cir. 1999).

ss See Moore v. Armour Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1194, 1198 (1lth Cir. 1991).
56 See Exxon Shipping Co. v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, 34 F.3d 774, 779 (9th Cir. 1994).
57

See Watts v. SEC, 482 F.3d 501, 508 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
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At the very heart of the circuit split surrounding judicial review of
agency action under Touhy regulations is the question of sovereign
immunity. Sovereign immunity is an ancient doctrine, one that prohibits a
court from compelling the action of the United States, or entertaining an
action against the United States, without the "sovereign's" consent.5 8 As
such, the government must clearly waive sovereign immunity if it is to be the
subject of suit or compelled to act by court order.59 The doctrine is
particularly powerful where a court attempts to restrain the government
from acting, or attempts to compel it to act (like when a court issues a thirdparty subpoena).60 In such cases, the court is essentially interfering with the
performance of executive duties, violating separation of powers, and halting
61
the executive from controlling its own resources.
It is easy to see why questions of third-party subpoenas call up the
question of sovereign immunity-the doctrine is implicated when a court's
judgment or order would interfere with "'the public treasury or domain, or
interfere with the public administration' or if the effect of the judgment
would be 'to restrain the Government from acting, or to compel it to act."'62
In the third-party subpoena case, the court's coopting of government
personnel to answer the subpoena or assemble requested documents would
both interfere with the public domain, and compel the government to act.
As such, a number of cases discuss the Touhy question in light of sovereign
immunity, and two competing interpretations have emerged in the circuit
courts.63

58 Library of Cong. v. Shaw, 478 U.S. 310, 315 (1986). "The Federal Government cannot be sued
without its consent." United States v. Navajo Nation, 556 U.S. 287, 289 (2009) (citation omitted). Such
consent to suit "must be unequivocally expressed." United States v. King, 395 U.S. 1, 4 (1969).

59 "Jurisdiction over any suit against the Government requires a clear statement from the United
States waiving sovereign immunity ...together with a claim falling within the terms of the waiver."
Cartwright Int'l Van Lines, Inc. v. Doan, 525 F. Supp. 2d 187, 194 (D.D.C. 2007) (quoting United States
v. White Mountain Apache Tribe, 537 U.S. 465, 472 (2003)).
6o Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 704 (1949) ("It is a far different
matter to permit a court to exercise its compulsive powers to restrain the Government from acting, or
to compel it to act. There are the strongest reasons of public policy for the rule that such relief cannot
be had against the sovereign.").
61

Id.

62

Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609, 620 (1963) (internal citations omitted).

See, e.g., Davis Enters. v. EPA, 877 F.2d 1181 (3d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1070 (1990)
(noting the issue of sovereign immunity in a case involving Touhy regulations); Boron Oil Co. v.
Downie, 873 F.2d 67, 71 (4th Cir. 1989) ("We have previously instructed that suits against federal
63
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Touhy and the Administrative ProcedureAct's Waiver of Sovereign
Immunity

Currently, the Fourth64 and Eleventh65 Circuits apply the APA to
conclude that an agency's refusal to comply with a subpoena is subject to the
standards articulated in the APA. Specifically, the APA requires a court to
uphold the decision of an administrative agency unless the decision is
"arbitrary and capricious."66
The application of the APA in the context of third-party subpoenas is
premised on a concept that might be sovereign immunity by outcome-the
idea that such subpoenas, although not technically against the sovereign and
actually against government employees, still implicate the protection of
sovereign immunity.67 This conclusion is based on the idea that obtaining
information from a federal employee in her official capacity is still an action
against the United States as a sovereign.68 Suit, or legal proceedings, are
considered to be against the sovereign if the judgment would "interfere with

employees may be barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity where the effect of the suit falls upon
the government...."); Envtl. Enters., Inc. v. EPA, 664 F. Supp. 585, 586 (D.D.C. 1987).
COMSAT Corp. v. Nat'l Sci. Found., 190 F.3d 269, 277 (4th Cir. 1999) ("We apply the APA's
deferential standard of review in full recognition of the fact that one of our sister circuits has decided
otherwise.").
65 Moore v. Armour Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1194, 1195 (11th Cir. 1991) (analyzing third-party
subpoena issue by assessing whether there was an abuse of discretion by HHS).
"hold unlawful and set aside agency
66 See 5U.S.C. § 706 (2018) (stating that a reviewing court shall
action, findings, and conclusions found to be... arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or
otherwise not in accordance with law").
67 Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682,688 (1949); Boron, 873 F.2d at 71
("[Slubpoena proceedings fall within the protection of sovereign immunity even though they are
technically against the federal employee and not against the sovereign."). Boron held that a state court,
or a federal court on removal, could not compel a federal employee to testify in a state court civil action
to which the United States was not a party. Id. at 70-71; see also Envtl. Enters., 664 F. Supp. at 586 ("As
to sovereign immunity, there is obvious merit to the argument that federal officers should not be
subpoenaed to testify in state courts proceedings of which they are not parties without their approval.");
Reynolds Metals Co. v. Crowther, 572 F. Supp. 288, 290-91 (D. Mass. 1982) (showing federal official's
refusal to testify in response to state court subpoena protected by sovereign immunity).
68 Boron, 873 F.2d at 71. In Distaff,Inc. v. Springfield ContractingCorp., 984 F.2d 108, 112 (4th Cir.
1993), the Fourth Circuit noted that agency heads may restrict the testimony of subordinates through
the promulgation of housekeeping regulations. "The policy behind such prohibitions on the testimony
of agency employees is to conserve governmental resources where the United States isnot a party to a
suit, and to minimize governmental involvement in controversial matters unrelated to official
business." Boron, 873 F.2d at 70 (quoting Reynolds Metals, 572 F. Supp. at 290).

.
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the public administration."69 In the case of third-party subpoenas, it is easy
to see that the marshalling of resources to produce documents or engage in
testimony would interfere with the normal public administration of an
agency's work; the agency is using time and resources differently than it
would under its normal public function.70
When a subpoena is issued against an agency for information that the
agency possesses relating to a lawsuit between other parties, the government,
i.e., the agency, is not a party to the underlying dispute. In these situations,
the Fourth and Eleventh Circuits find that the APA provides the only avenue
for review of the agency's decision to prohibit its employees from producing
the information requested in the subpoena.71 The legal conclusion here flows
from a direct reading of the APA. If there is final agency action,72 the APA
in § 702 explicitly waives the government's sovereign immunity73 and
permits a federal court to review the agency's action, so long as the relief is
not money damages and the plaintiff claims that "an agency or an officer or
employee thereof acted or failed to act in an official capacity or under color

69 Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609, 620 (1963) (quoting Land v. Dollar, 330 U.S. 731 (1947));
Portsmouth Redevelopment & Hous. Auth. v. Pierce, 706 F.2d 471,473 (4th Cir. 1983).
70 See Boron, 873 F.2d at 70-71. Indeed, the number of subpoenas received by the government's
agencies seems staggering, estimated by the Department of Labor in 1986 to be "more than 1,500
subpoenas.. each year on Department employees." Alexv. Jasper Wyman & Son, 115 F.R.D. 156, 157
n.3 (D. Me. 1986). One can imagine a situation in which "officials might find themselves spending all

of their time doing nothing but complying. .. and thus they would have little opportunity to pursue
their important governmental responsibilities." Envtl. Enters., 664 F. Supp. at 586.
71 COMSAT Corp. v. Nat'l Sci. Found., 190 F.3d 269, 274 (4th Cir. 1999).
72 The Supreme Court has defined final agency action in Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177-78
(1997) (collecting cases for the propositions that final agency action is the consummation of the
agency's decision-making process and is an action from which legal consequences will flow). In
COMSAT Corp., 190 F.3d 269, the Fourth Circuit found that an agency's decision not to allow its
employees to answer a third-party subpoena was a final agency decision for purposes of the APA.
73 The APA provides a waiver of sovereign immunity by authorizing judicial review of agency
action that is arbitrary or capricious. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2018); see Davis Enters v. EPA, 877 F.2d
1181, 1186 (3d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1070 (1990) (an agency employee's failure to comply
with a subpoena reviewable as agency action under the APA). As noted above, the government can only
be sued, or compelled to act under court order, with its consent. FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475
(1994). The APA sets forth a general waiver of sovereign immunity: "A person suffering legal wrong
because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a
relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof." 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2018); see also City of Alexandria
v. FEMA, 781 F. Supp. 2d 340, 347 (W.D. La. 2011) (discussing the limited waiver of sovereign
immunity present in the APA).
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of legal authority."74 It seems clear that a claim that agency employees failed
to answer a valid subpoena is in fact a claim for relief that is not money
damages. Additionally, in refusing to answer the subpoena, the agency has
interpreted and acted under its own internal authority-i.e., its Touhy
regulations.75 As such, the court is reviewing the agency's final decision76
pursuant to its own regulations, which implicates the language of § 702.77
Section 706 then directs a reviewing court to set aside final agency action
that is arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with the law.78
An example is helpful. In COMSTAT Corp. v. National Science
Foundation,the National Science Foundation (NSF) appealed an order that
required it to comply with subpoenas issued by an arbitrator during
prehearing discovery.79 The subpoenas arose out of questions of liability for
certain cost overruns for a construction project undertaken by an NSF grant
awardee.80 Specifically, the NSF awardee had sub-contracted for the building
of a state-of-the-art radio telescope in West Virginia-when the project went
over budget, the plaintiff sub-contractor COMSTAT Corporation sued the
grant awardee to recover an additional twenty-nine million dollars in costs.81
The suit went to mandatory arbitration pursuant to the construction
contract, and the arbitrator issued a subpoena to the NSF asking the agency
to turn over all documents relating to the telescope project.82
NSF refused to comply with the subpoena, citing its internal Touhy
regulations at 45 C.F.R. § 615.5, which block employees from producing
official records or providing any testimony without the General Counsel's
explicit permission.83 Additionally, the NSF's General Counsel can only
grant an employee permission to testify or produce records when, among

74 5 U.S.C. § 702.
75 COMSAT Corp., 190 F.3d at 271.
76 See Top Choice Distribs., Inc. v. U.S. Postal Serv., 138 F.3d 463, 466 (2d Cir. 1998) ("Finality is
an explicit requirement of the APA .... "); Air Espana v. Brien, 165 F.3d 148, 152 (2d Cir. 1999) ("The
APA explicitly requires that an agency action be final before a claim is ripe for review.").
77

United States v. Williams, 170 F.3d 431,434 (4th Cir. 1999).

78

5 U.S.C. § 706.

79

COMSATCorp., 190 F.3d at 271.

8o

Id. at 272-73.

81 Id.
82

Id.

83

Id.; 45 C.F.R § 615.5 (2020).

-
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other things, fulfilling the request would: (1) be in keeping with the
regulation's purposes (i.e., to promote efficient operations, avoid
controversial issues, and maintain NSF impartiality); (2) be necessary to
prevent a miscarriage of justice; (3) promote NSF's interest in the decision
that may be rendered in the legal proceeding; and (4) be in the best interest
of NSF.84
Following NSF's refusal to comply with the subpoena, the arbitrator
issued three additional subpoenas that required the NSF Document
Custodian to produce all documents relating to the telescope project, and
two NSF employees familiar with the grant awardee to appear and produce
all documents in their possession relating to the telescope project.8s
NSF again refused to produce the documents, explaining its analysis
under its Touhy regulations at 45 C.F.R. § 615.5(b).86 In so analyzing, the
General Counsel articulated that:
(1) Fulfilling the demand would be needlessly uneconomical, as it
was duplicative of an earlier Freedom of Information Act
request filed by the plaintiff,
(2) Production would be needlessly burdensome because the
documents could be discovered from the grant awardee;
(3) Production would not further the goal of maintaining NSF's
neutrality because NSF had no joint agreement with its grant
awardee; and
(4) The balance of interests were such that compliance was not
needed to prevent a miscarriage of justice and would not be in
the public interest.87

COMSAT Corp., 190 F.3d at 272-73. NSF also noted its refusal to comply because it believed that
much of the information being sought in the subpoenas was contained in a previous Freedom of
Information Act request field by the plaintiff. Id. at 272. Pursuant to that request, NSF had apparently
"identified over 40 linear feet of files that might contain [responsive] documents." Id. at 272 n.4; NSF
warned the plaintiff that copying such files would cost upwards of $20,000. Id. The plaintiff then
narrowed its request and NSF began photocopying documents, but ultimately stopped when plaintiff
failed to pay the photocopying costs. Id. at 272 & n.4. The cost of copying is a likely reason that the NSF
continued to object to production.
85

Id. at 272.

86

Id. at 273.

87

Id.
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After an additional exchange of letters,S8 to no avail, the plaintiff
brought a motion to compel in the federal district court.89 A veritable
procedural mess ensued. Plaintiff argued that NSF was actually a party to the
proceeding because it had named NSF in the caption of its motion.90
Pursuant to this reasoning, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45 would govern
NSF's responses to the subpoena.91 Ruling from the bench, the magistrate
agreed with the plaintiff and held that NSF could not use sovereign
immunity as a defense to answering the subpoenas.92 Further, the magistrate
found that NSF had waived its right to object to the subpoenas by ignoring
certain internal regulations requiring the NSF's General Counsel to inform
the court that the demand was being reviewed and to seek a stay of the
demand pending a final determination.93 An order was entered directing the
NSF to comply with the subpoenas.94
In the Fourth Circuit, the court led its analysis by noting that "although
review of
[the] review of the district court's legal conclusions is de novo ...
NSF's refusal to comply with the subpoenas is governed by the [APA]."95 As
such, the court chose to apply a "deferential standard" that examined
whether NSF's refusal to comply with the third-party subpoenas was an
action that could be considered "arbitrary and capricious."96

88 Specifically:

NSF requested further clarification of COMSAT's justification for seeking to depose [the
two NSF employees]. COMSAT responded with the explanation that these NSF employees
had discussed the [project with the grant awardee]. NSF responded in turn with a request
for additional clarification from [plaintiff], and in a September 28, 1998, letter the agency
indicated that it had not reached a final decision with respect to the deposition subpoenas.
Id.
89 Id.
9o

Id.

91 Id.,
92 Id.

93Id. at 273-74; see also 45 C.F.R. § 615.6(c) (2020) ("If a response to a demand is required before
the General Counsel has made the determination referred to in § 615.6(b), the General Counsel shall
provide the court or other competent authority with a copy of this part, inform the court or other
competent authority that the demand is being reviewed, and seek a stay of the demand pending a final
determination.").
94 COMSATCorp., 190 F.3d at 274.

95Id. (citation omitted).
96

Id. at 277.
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The arbitrary and capricious standard is well-settled-it is narrow, and
97
the court should not substitute its judgment for that of the agency.
However, the agency must still have a satisfactory explanation for its chosen
action, including a "rational connection between the facts found and the
choice made."98 Courts "consider whether the decision was based on a
consideration of the relevant factors and whether there has been a clear error
of judgment."99
In so reviewing, the Fourth Circuit agreed with the plaintiff that NSF's
Touhy regulations could not immunize the agency from the duty to answer
the subpoena; rather, it was the concept of sovereign immunity that allowed
the agency to refuse to comply.100 When the agency, NSF, read and applied
its Touhy regulations, it implicated the judicial review provisions of the APA,
which waive sovereign immunity and allow a federal court to compel
production if the agency's refusal to comply with the subpoena was arbitrary
or capricious.101
As such, the Fourth Circuit turned its analysis to the decision made by
NSF regarding the third-party subpoenas and the reasons provided by the
agency. 102 The court explored the agency's reasons for failing to complynamely, that the NSF General Counsel had provided a detailed breakdown
of the costs of compliance in light of the fact that most of the documents
requested were available in an earlier Freedom of Information Act request
(one for which the requesting party, the plaintiff, had failed to keep up on its
copying bills).103 The General Counsel had explained that to comply with the
subpoena now was to essentially charge the taxpayers for work that the
plaintiff failed to pay for on its own-something that did not keep with the
agency's mission or its responsibility as a "taxpayer-funded" organization.104
The Fourth Circuit found that it simply could not second-guess the
agency's decision-making; essentially, the agency had reached a policy
decision that was well-grounded in its mission and financial reality, which
97 Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of the United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S.
29, 43 (1983).

98 Burlington Truck Lines v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962).
99 Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n, 463 U.S. at 43 (citations omitted).
1ooCOMSAT Corp., 190 F.3d at 277.
ioi Id.; United Statesv. Williams, 170 F.3d 431,434 (4th Cir. 1999).
102See generally COMSAT Corp., 190 F.3d 269.
103 Id. at 277.
104

Id. at 277-78.
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could not be arbitrary nor capricious. Further, the court noted that there
were over twenty-thousand additional NSF grantees, and that allowing a
private litigant embroiled in conflict with a grantee to always seek such costly
information from the agency would place a "potential cumulative burden
upon the agency [that] becomes alarmingly large."105 What the court did not
say, but which seems clear from the face of the analysis, is that the NSF had
made an appropriate decision to avoid taking on the cost of a project for
which the plaintiff should have funded on its own. Had the plaintiff
continued to pay its bills for photocopying and completed the Freedom of
Information Act request, it would have gathered the documents that it
desired. Seeking a third-party subpoena appeared to be a way to push the
cost of the documents on the NSF and the taxpayers, while saving the
plaintiff some money.
The Fourth Circuit's reasoning basically encapsulates a longstanding
tradition of deference to an agency's policymaking authority.106 Indeed, the
Fourth Circuit itself recognized the importance of such deference by citing
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,07 which
noted that "federal judges-who have no constituency-have a duty to
respect legitimate policy choices made by those who do."08 This concept of
deference to agency policymakers has been recognized in every federal
circuit and serves as a cornerstone for judicial deference. The premise exists
on the foundation of separation of powers and the idea that agency decision
makers, who are accountable to elected officials and thus share their political
accountability, are the sole purveyors of policy.'09 Particularly in
administrative law cases, courts comment on the subject-matter expertise of
the agency as compared to the generalist knowledge of Article III judges.'1o

ios Id.at 278.
Burlington Truck Lines v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168-69 (1962); COMSAT Corp.,
o6 See, e.g.,
190 F.3d at 278.
107 Id.

io8Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 866 (1984).

io See Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 194 (1978) ("Once Congress, exercising its
delegated powers, has decided the order of priorities in a given area, it is for the Executive to administer
the laws and for the courts to enforce them when enforcement is sought.").
itAustin v. Am. Ass'n of Neurological Surgeons, 253 F.3d 967, 972 (7th Cir. 2001) ("Judges are not
experts in any field except law."); id. (specifically noting that "[m]uch escapes [judges]" in "highly
technical field [s]").
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Like the Fourth Circuit, the approach taken by the Eleventh Circuit
looks to the APA, but with a wandering eye towards the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. In Moore v. Armour Pharmaceutical Co., parents of
children who had been allegedly infected with HIV during blood
transfusions sued the companies that supplied the blood in federal district
court in Florida.'], During this underlying litigation, the parents
subpoenaed two Center for Disease Control (CDC) physicians who
researched methods for detecting HIV in donated blood.112 Interestingly, the
two physicians had actually made their research public and shared
recommendations with the defendant companies.113 The Department of
Health and Human Services (HHS), the parent agency of the CDC, denied
permission for the parents to depose the doctors, stating that it received so
many requests that to honor them all would force the CDC to cease its other
functions. 14 Further, HHS expressed concern that it should remain neutral
in private litigation or risk "frank, free, and full exchanges within the
scientific community."115
At the heart of the Eleventh Circuit's discussion was, of course, HHS's
Touhy regulations and the Housekeeping Statute at § 301.116 HHS's Touhy
regulations provided that:
No employee or former employee of the [HHS] may provide
testimony or produce documents in any proceedings to which this
part applies concerning information acquired in the course of
performing official duties or because of the person's official
relationship with the [HHS] unless authorized by the Agency head
pursuant to this part based on a determination.., that compliance
with the request would promote the objectives of the [HHS] .117
Although recognizing Touhy and its "unbroken line of authority"
contending that "a federal employee may not be compelled to obey a
subpoena contrary to his federal employer's instructions under valid agency

1il

Moore v.Armour Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1194, 1195-96 (1lthCir. 1991).

112

Id.

113 Id.at 1196.
114 Id.

H5 Id.
116 Id.
117 45 C.F.R. § 2.3 (2020).

2020]

TERRIBLE TOUHY

1521

regulations," the court also noted that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
"favor full discovery whenever possible."18 The court noted that it would
overturn HHS's action only if it found that such action was "arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not contrary to law"-the
standard used under the APA for review of agency action.19
In applying the "arbitrary and capricious" standard of review, the court
noted that there was no abuse of discretion by the agency because HHS, on
behalf of the CDC, had expressed its interest in conserving the time and
attention of CDC employees for the public mission of the fight against AIDS
and HIV.120 The parents were essentially competing for the doctors' time
with the public, and the CDC believed that the time was better used
researching methods that would mitigate a national health crisis.21
Essentially, the parents lost a policy battle-no competing policy interest
could outweigh letting two of the nation's leading health researchers
continue their lifesaving work. Further, the burden on the agency was simply
too great in loss of time, manpower, and valuable employees distracted from
their primary tasks. 122
This reasoning parallels that of additional Supreme Court case law that
agencies should be the ones to set their resources and prioritize their tasks,
and that these decisions are "committed to agency discretion" by law per the
APA.123 The Supreme Court has consistently noted that agency decisions
that involve the balancing of resources are best left in the hands of the
agency. For example, when an agency decides not to pursue an enforcement
action, this is considered the product of a balancing of resources and
priorities and therefore is not even subject to judicial review.124 Similarly, an

18

Moore, 927 F.2d at 1197 (citing FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1)).

119 Id.
120 Id.

121Id. at 1198 ("Each day that Dr. Evatt and other doctors employed by the CDC spend giving
deposition testimony is a day they are kept from doing research that might save numerous lives.").
122See Moore v. Armour Pharm. Co., 129 F.R.D. 551, 554 (N.D. Ga. 1990) (noting that requests for
CDC deposition testimony are "overwhelming").
123Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182, 191 (1993) (holding that the decision to reassign agency staff was
not subject to judicial review because it involved questions of balancing resources and determining how
the agency should meet its statutory mandate).
124Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985). Heckler listed the following factors that must be
considered when an agency declines an enforcement proceeding:
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agency's decision not to grant reconsideration of an action is beyond judicial
review because it involves a balancing of factors and policies that require the
agency's expertise.125 The Touhy schema are similar in their balancing tests
that require agency expertise. For example, the Touhy regulations adopted
by the Department of Veteran's Affairs (VA), codified at 38 C.F.R.
§§ 14.800-14.810, require that the VA determine the nature of the testimony
requested, and evaluate factors like the need to avoid spending time and
money of the United States for private purposes, how the testimony or
production would assist the department in performing its duties, and
26
whether the demand is overly burdensome or inappropriate. 1
In the third-party subpoena review theory articulated by the Fourth
and Eleventh Circuits, the agency's decision not to comply with the
subpoena is a political policy choice based on resource allocation and public
benefits.127 Further, private litigants would still maintain a way to challenge
the agency's response to a third-party subpoena-such litigants can seek the
review of the federal court pursuant to the APA.128 For example, in United
States v. Williams, a criminal defendant indicted for murder attempted to
subpoena files from the FBI while claiming that they contained exculpatory

[W]hether a violation has occurred, []whether agency resources are best spent on this
violation or another, whether the agency is likely to succeed if it acts, whether the particular
enforcement action requested best fits the agency's overall policies, and, indeed, whether the
agency has enough resources to undertake the action at all.
Id. Not unsimilar factors must be balanced under an agency's Touhy regulations-the agency must look
to whether it is a good use of agency resources to participate, whether the agency can succeed in its
public and statutory mission by participating, whether participating risks government neutrality in
third-party matters and exposes the agency to needless controversy, and whether the agency can bear
the expense and lost manpower in complying.
125

ICC v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng'rs, 482 U.S. 270, 282 (1987).

126

38 C.F.R. § 14.804 (2020).

It is worth noting here that no circuit has found agency decisions on third-party subpoenas to
be wholly beyond the scope ofjudicial review. Even if this type of agency balancing could be considered
presumptively unreviewable, "the presumption may be rebutted where the substantive statute has
provided guidelines for the agency to follow in exercising its enforcement powers." Heckler, 470 U.S. at
127

832-33. Further, the Touhy regulations provide a mechanism by which to review the agency's balancing
of policy factors.
128 COMSAT Corp. v. Nat'l Sci. Found., 190 F.3d 269,278 (4th Cir. 1999) ("Private litigantswho are
dissatisfied with an agency's response to a third-party subpoena or to a FOIA request may still obtain
federal court review under the APA.").
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evidence.129 The FBI refused to obey the subpoena on the basis of the DOJ's
Touhy regulations.130 When the Fourth Circuit considered the matter, it
noted that the defendant had recourse if he was unsatisfied with the agency's
response to the subpoena; specifically, he could seek judicial review of the
agency's final decision through the APA, §§ 701-706.131 Should the
subpoena-seeker attempt to exercise this option, the federal court would
review to determine if the agency's decision was "arbitrary, capricious, an
abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law."132 Further, the
federal court could "compel agency action unlawfully withheld or
unreasonably delayed."133
In sum, the position articulated by the Fourth and Eleventh Circuits
prizes the expertise of agencies in running their own affairs, as well as the
prominence of the APA in reviewing agency decisions. The decision to
ultimately allow or not allow the production of documents or the testimony
of agency employees is committed to the agency's discretion and will be
reviewed under the APA's "arbitrary and capricious" standard for final
agency actions. In applying that "arbitrary and capricious" standard of
review, it does not particularly matter if the agency could theoretically, or
even practically, achieve the request of the subpoena. For example, in Boron
Oil Co. v. Downie, the Fourth Circuit recognized that the agency that
received the third-party subpoena, the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA), could have complied with the subpoena "without undermining the
t29 United States v. Williams, 170 F.3d 431,432 (4th Cir. 1999). The defendant had been convicted
of murder previously, and the FBI had assisted with the investigation at the request of state officials. Id.
The first conviction was overturned on appeal and the defendant attempted to subpoena the FBI files
during his second trial on the murder charges. Id.
i3o

Id. at 432-34.

Id. at 434. Under the APA, "[a] person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or
adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to
judicial review thereof." 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2018); see Smith v. Cromer, 159 F.3d 875, 881 (4th Cir. 1998)
(explaining that the remedy for an agency's refusal to answer a third-party subpoena "may be found in
the [APA] which expressly limits such review authority to the federal courts").
131

132

5.U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).

Id. § 706(1); see also Williams, 170 F.3d at 434 (noting that "a state criminal defendant, aggrieved
by the response of a federal law enforcement agency made under its regulations, may assert his
constitutional claim to the investigative information before the district court, which possesses authority
under the APA to compel the law enforcement agency to produce the requested information in
appropriate cases"); COMSAT Corp., 190 F.3d 269, 277-78 (4th Cir. 1999) ("Private litigants who are
dissatisfied with an agency's response to a third-party subpoena or to a FOIA request may still obtain
federal court review under the APA.").
133
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immediate purposes for the EPA regulations." 134 The court noted, however,
that the agency could have a valid interest in preventing its expert employees
from being distracted by requests for testimony in private actions.135 This
reasoning would protect the priorities of the EPA and leave its employees
free to pursue their official business as required by their taxpayer-funded
mission. 136

B.

Touhy andFederalRule of Civil Procedure45- The Power of the
FederalCourt

The Fourth Circuit's approach is clear-the Housekeeping Statute at
§ 301, the existence of an agency's Touhy regulations, and the collection of
case law on the matter establish that a federal agency can restrict documents
and employee testimony by the exercise of valid agency authority.37 This
exercise of valid agency authority is an indication that the agency did not
waive its sovereign immunity in the proceeding.38 The Fifth Circuit has
gone so far as to state that Touhy regulations "evince an intent not to waive
the [agency]'s sovereign immunity."139 As such, the only way to review the
agency's refusal to comply with a summons or subpoena is to assess whether
it was "arbitrary and capricious" under the APA, which does contain a
waiver of sovereign immunity at § 702.140

lm Boron Oil Co. v. Downie, 873 F.2d 67, 71 (4th Cir. 1989).
135

Id.

The desire for agencies to protect their internal priorities and resources is well-established in case
law. Id. at 70 (purpose of EPA's Touhy regulations is to conserve resources); Envtl. Enters., Inc. v. EPA,
136

664 F. Supp. 585, 586 (D.D.C. 1987) (Touhy regulations balance the need for private litigants to achieve
information with the need for the government to conserve its limited resources); Se. Pennsylvania
Transp. Auth. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 103 F.R.D. 12, 14 (E.D. Pa. 1984) (finding legitimacy for the
Department of Transportation to avoid funding private litigation).
Edwards v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 43 F.3d 312, 317 (7th Cir. 1994).
Omni Pinnacle, LLC v. All S. Consulting Eng'rs, LLC, No. 12-1617, 2012 WL 12296176, at *2
(E.D. La. Sept. 7, 2012) (finding that there was no waiver of sovereign immunity when the USDA
refused to authorize an employee to appear at a deposition in a case where the United States was not a
party because an assertion of the Touhy regulations indicated that the agency was preserving sovereign
immunity).
139 Louisiana v. Sparks, 978 F.2d 226, 235 (5th Cir. 1992).
137
138

140 "The APA contains a limited waiver of sovereign immunity." Teton Historic Aviation Found. v.
U.S. Dep't of Def., 686 F. Supp. 2d 75,78 (D.D.C. 2010); see also 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2018) (stating that under
the APA "action [s] in a court of the United States seeking relief other than money damages and stating

20201

TERRIBLE TOUHY

1525

The Ninth Circuit and the D.C. Circuit view this landscape differently.
These circuits hold instead that agencies do not have a valid basis in
sovereign immunity to use Touhy regulations to refuse to comply with a
summons or subpoena because such a position would "violate the
fundamental principle that 'the public... has a right to every man's
evidence."'"1 As such, an agency's refusal to comply with a summons or
subpoena is analyzed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45 (as it would
be in all other cases).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45 establishes that a court "must quash
or modify a subpoena that... subjects a person to undue burden."142
Whether or not there is an undue burden is determined by looking to: (1)
the relevance of the requested information; (2) the need for the party for the
information; (3) the breath of the request; (4) the time period covered by the
request; (5) the particularity with which the party describes the requested
information; and (6) the burden imposed.43 "Further, if the person to whom
the document request is made is a non-party, the court may also consider
the expense and inconvenience to the non-party." 144
The most prominent case on the use of Federal Rule 45 in the context
of third-party subpoenas to federal agencies is Exxon Shipping Co. v. U.S.
Department of Interior,145 decided by the Ninth Circuit. Exxon Shipping
Corporation and Exxon Corporation (collectively, Exxon) faced an
underlying civil damages action arising out of the Exxon Valdez oil spill.146
In defending against that action for damages, Exxon sought the depositions

a claim that an agency or an officer or employee thereof acted or failed to act in an official
capacity... [can]not be dismissed nor relief therein be denied on the ground that it is against the United
States").
141 Exxon Shipping Co. v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, 34 F.3d 774, 779 (9th Cir. 1994) (quoting United
States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950)).
142

FED. R CIV. P. 45.

Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 392 F.3d 812,818 (5th Cir. 2004).
Id.; Cusumano v. Microsoft Corp., 162 F.3d 708, 717 (1st Cir. 1998) (noting that "concern for
the unwanted burden thrust upon non-parties is a factor entitled to special weight in evaluating the
balance of competing needs" in Rule 45 inquiry).
143

144

145

Exxon Shipping Co., 34 F.3d 774.

"[C]ommercial fishermen, landowners, local governments, businesses, and others sued Exxon
seeking compensatory and punitive damages for injuries they allegedly suffered as a result of the Exxon
Valdez oil spill." Id. at 775.
146
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of ten federal employees from five administrative .agencies.147 In response to
these requests, the federal government refused to let eight of the requested
employees testify, and seriously restricted the testimony of the remaining
two requested employees.148 These decisions were made under the agencies'
Touhy regulations, which, as discussed above, generally prohibit a federal
employee from testifying unless she receives permission from the proper
agency authority. 149
Exxon was particularly concerned about the failure to obtain
deposition testimony from the government witnesses, as these witnesses had
information relating to the extent of damage the oil spill had on Alaska's
natural resources. As such, Exxon filed a complaint on the following
grounds:
(1)

The government could not refuse to comply with the
discovery requests under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure;

(2)

The agencies' actions were not authorized by their Touhy
regulations; and

(3)

The agencies' actions violated the APA.

The agencies, in an argument adopted by the district court, asserted
that the Housekeeping Statute at § 301 authorizes agency heads to prohibit
their employees from testifying in litigation in which the United States is not
a party. Additionally, the agencies cited the holding in Touhy-that
subordinate federal officials could not be held in contempt for refusing to

147 The agencies involved were the Department of the Interior, the Department of Agriculture, the
Department of Commerce, the National Marine Fisheries Service, and the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Association.
148 Interestingly, the agencies did
not formally answer the discovery requests-they merely
instructed employees not to attend or to provide limited testimony. Id. at 776.
149 See, e.g., 43 C.F.R. § 2.289(b) (2020) (Department of the Interior-"[a]fter consulting with the
Solicitor's Office or, in the case of the Office of Inspector General, its General Counsel, the official in
charge will decide whether to grant the Touhy Request"); 7 C.F.R. § 1.214(b)(1) (2020) (Department of
Agriculture-"[aln employee of USDA served with a valid summons, subpoena, or other compulsory
process .. may appear only if such appearance has been authorized by the head of his or her USDA
agency"); 15 C.F.R. § 15.18(a) (2020) (Department of Commerce-an "employee may not testify as an
expert or opinion witness for any other party other than the United States").
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comply with a subpoena when the agency's internal housekeeping
regulations prohibited them from disclosing the documents or testifying.]50
The Ninth Circuit quickly pointed out a key difference between the
situation at bar and the one in Touhy. In Exxon, the agencies themselves were
the named parties, not subordinate agency officials. And, Touhy itself
specifically declined to reach the question of whether the agency or agency
head had power under a claim of privilege to withhold testimony or
documents.151 Indeed, other courts had held that Touhy and its progeny did
not apply when the order at issue was directed to the agency head.152
In analyzing the situation in Exxon, the Ninth Circuit noted that the
language of the Housekeeping Statute specifically noted that it did not
"authorize withholding information from the public or limiting the
availability of records to the public."153 This specific sentence was added to
the statute in 1958 after Congress became concerned that the agencies and
executive officials operating under the statute had used the language of § 301
as a shield to prevent disclosure of information to the public, or to
Congress.154 The House Report accompanying the addition noted that the
sentence was specifically added to ensure that the executive branch could not
use § 301 as a substantive basis to withhold information or as an executive
privilege.155 Indeed, other cases have noted that doing so would create a
iso Exxon ShippingCo., 34 F.3d 774.
1s1 United States ex rel. Touhy v. Ragen, 340 U.S. 462, 467 (1951) ("We find it unnecessary... to
consider the ultimate reach of the authority of the Attorney General to refuse to produce at a court's
order the government papers in his possession .... ").

152 NLRB v. Capitol Fish Co., 294 F.2d 868, 873-74 (5th Cir. 1961); Reynolds v. United States, 192
F.2d 987, 992-93 (3d Cir. 1951), rev'd on other grounds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953). As such, it seems for the
Ninth Circuit that the only thing to take from Touhy is that "a challenge to the Attorney General's
decision cannot be initiated by contempt orders against an agent who has been denied permission to
testify." Gomez v. Gates (In re Boeh), 25 F.3d 761, 766 (9th Cir. 1994).

Shipping Co., 34 F.3d at 777.
H.R_ REP. NO. 85-1461 (1958), as reprinted in 1958 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3352, 3364-65. Interestingly,
the legislative history of the 1958 amendment to the Housekeeping Statute also contains indications of
support for the executive's control over its limited resources. At least one representative stated that:
153 Exxon
54

[T]he legislative branch neither had, has, nor can it be given, authority to interfere with the
basicprinciples under which the other two branches operate ... . The executive departments
derive their basic authority from the Constitution ... and it is for the president or
individuals selected by him to control the exercise of that power.

155 Exxon Shipping Co., 34 F.3d at 777 (discussing the first instance of the Housekeeping Statute
being used as a shield for executive agencies-"[tlhe statute was apparently first used to deny
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perverse result by exceeding the congressional delegation of authority
contained in the Housekeeping Statute.156 Essentially, the Housekeeping
Statute only provided enabling authority to adopt rules of organization, but
did not address whether papers or records were privileged.157
Additionally, the Ninth Circuit examined the Supreme Court's holding
in Chrysler Corp. v. Brown for additional support for the proposition that
§ 301 did not supply an independent executive privilege. In Chrysler, the
Court held that § 301 wasmerely a "housekeeping statute."'1 As such, it was
properly characterized as a "'rule[] of agency organization procedure or
practice' as opposed to [a] 'substantive rule[]."'159 According to the Ninth
Circuit, "neither the statute's text, its legislative history, nor Supreme Court
case law supports the government's argument that § 301 authorizes agency
heads to withhold documents or testimony from federal courts."160
After resolving the issues surrounding the Housekeeping Statute, the
court turned its attention to the trickier question of sovereign immunity161
information to the public in 1877, when a California newspaperman sought politically sensitive files
from the Hayes Administration"); see also Don Lively, Government Housekeeping Authority:
BureaucraticPrivileges Without a BureaucraticPrivilege, HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 495, 500 (1981) ("As
the legislative history accompanying the 1958 amendment to the housekeeping statute shows, Congress
intended that the statute itself should not double as a form of privilege."). The Senate Report also spoke
to this issue: "Nothing in the legislative history of [§ 301] shows that Congress intended this statute to
be a grant of authority to the heads of the executive departments to withhold information from the
public or to limit the availability of records to the public." S. REP. No. 85-1621, at 2 (1958).
156 In re Packaged Ice Antitrust Litig., No. 08-md-01952,2011 WL 1790189, at '13 (E.D. Mich. May
10, 2011).
157 Id.; see also In re Motion to Compel Compliance with Subpoena Direct to Dep't of Veterans
Affairs, 257 F.R.D. 12, 15 (D.D.C. 2009) (explaining that Touhy regulations "do not... confer a separate
privilege upon the government, nor create a legal basis to withhold information pursuant to a federal
subpoena").

158

Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 310 (1979).

159

Id.

i6o Exxon Shipping Co., 34 F.3d at 778. The court also rejected the government's argument that it
could stop employees from testifying in judicial proceedings because the Housekeeping Statute allows
the agency the authority to control "the conduct of its employees." Id. at 777. The court, however, noted
that its precedent had already established that there was no distinction for purposes of Touhy between
subpoenas seeking testimony or those seeking the production of documents. Id.; see also Gomez v.
Gates (In re Boeh), 25 F.3d 761, 766 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that "[tihere is no difference... between
the power of the Attorney General to specify what records a subordinate may release and the power to
specify what information a subordinate may release through testimony").
161 The government's brief specifically argued a line of reasoning from holdings of the Fourth
Circuit-Exxon was seeking testimony from federal employees, and thus, was essentially compelling
the government to act (which it is not compelled to do absent a waiver of sovereign immunity).

2020]

TERRIBLE TOUHY

1529

In doing so, it confronted headfirst the issue of the Fourth Circuit's existing
line of authority on the matter. Specifically, the government had cited
Boron162 for the position that an action against a federal official through a
subpoena was an action against the United States itself, therefore implicating
questions of sovereign immunity. The Ninth Circuit quickly took the
opportunity to distinguish it-specifically, it noted that the Fourth Circuit
had decided to link its Touhy approach to sovereign immunity because the
factual situation before the Boron court involved a situation in which a state,
not federal, court was attempting to subpoena federal officials.163 Due to
considerations of sovereign immunity, a state court (or a federal court with
only removal jurisdiction) could not compel the behavior of a federal
official; however, "[s]uch limitations do not apply when a federal court
exercises its subpoena power against federal officials."164
The Exxon court also considered the separation of powers implications
of the government's arguments that the Touhy regulations protected their
employees from testifying; namely, if such arguments were allowed, the
executive branch would be making decisions that implicated judicial control
over evidence in a federal case. 165 Further, the court looked to an ancient
doctrine-the doctrine of "every man's evidence." Initially a principle of
ancient British law, the "every man's evidence doctrine establish [es] that the
public has a right to every man's evidence, and that there exists in the law a
general duty to give testimony one is capable of giving."166 Should evidence

162

Boron Oil Co. v. Downie, 873 F.2d 67,69 (4th Cir. 1989).

Exxon Shipping Co., 34 F.3d at 778. The Exxon court had to do an additional sidestep around
some of its own authority. In Swett v. Schenk, 792 F.2d 1447, 1451-52 (9th Cir. 1986), the Ninth Circuit
had affirmed the dismissal of a state court's contempt proceeding against a National Transportation
Safety Board's investigator who had, pursuant to the agency's Touhy regulations, limited his testimony
on certain matters. The party who had requested the investigator's testimony was apparently
attempting to use him as an expert witness. Id. In Exxon, the court noted that this holding was
undistributed because sovereign immunity prohibited the state court from subpoenaing a federal
employee (thus creating a jurisdictional issue). Exxon Shipping Co., 34 F.3d at 778.
163

164 In re Boeh, 25 F.3d at 770 (Norris, J., dissenting) (noting that the Ninth Circuit had already held
that a state court lacked jurisdiction to use contempt proceedings against a National Transportation
Safety Board investigator). Such a limitation applies on removal because "removal jurisdiction is
derivative [and] the district court acquired no jurisdiction on removal." Id. (citation omitted).
165 Exxon Shipping Co., 34 F.3d at 778 ("[J]udicial control over the evidence in a case cannot be
abdicated to the caprice of executive officers." (quoting United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 9- 10
(1953))).
166 12 Parl. Hist. Eng. 693 (1812) (noting the speech of Lord Chancellor Hardwicke on May 25, 1742,
in the House of the Lords); Robert S. Catz & Jill J.Lange, JudicialPrivilege,22 GA. L. REV. 89 (1987); see
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not be available by compulsory process, havoc is wreaked as to a judicial
system which relies on the zealous advocacy of adversarial positions. 167
Since neither the Housekeeping Statute nor the doctrine of sovereign
immunity were at play, the Ninth Circuit determined that any third-party
subpoenas received by the government would be analyzed under the normal
rules of the game-Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26(c) and 45, which
provide discretion for the district court to quash subpoenas that would
create an undue burden.168 If the government was worried about third-party
subpoenas creating excessive work for its employees, or distracting from its
public mission,6 9 the court articulated that such concerns would be
mitigated by the operation of the Federal Rules. Specifically, the court
pointed to the following protections:
0

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45(c)(3)(A)(ii), which
allows a district court to quash a subpoena that requires
a person to travel beyond 100 miles where the person
resides, is employed or regularly transacts business, or
beyond the state where the person resides, is employed,
or regularly transacts business if the person is a party or

also United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950) ("Every exemption from testifying or producing
records thus presupposes a very real interest to be protected. If a privilege based upon that interest is
asserted, its validity must be assessed."). Lord Chancellor Hardwicke set out the principle as such in
1742: "[T]he public has a right to every man's evidence, a maxim which in its proper sense cannot be
denied." 12 Par. Hist. Eng. 693. The maxim establishes that the integrity of the judicial system, and its
truth-by-adversarial-argument approach, require a full disclosure of all facts. As such, there must be
some process by which each side can attain the facts needed to advocate its case. Only common law,
statutory, or constitutional privileges can overcome the principle that each side should be able to attain
facts needed for its case. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709 (1974).
167

Nixon, 418 U.S. at 709.

168 Exxon

Shipping Co., 34 F.3d at 779 (citing Rule 26(c) and Rule 45(c)(3)).

The government apparently had quite a bit to worry about here, accusing Exxon of articulating
a position that would turn the government into a "speakers' bureau for private litigants." Id. at 779. At
oral argument, the government noted the substantial number of third-party subpoena's received every
year-the "National Weather Service alone receives hundreds of requests a year from private litigants
seeking to introduce evidence about weather patterns in cases as routine as minor car accidents." Id.
The theoretical possibility of having to answer all those subpoenas would result in a huge loss of
manpower hours, increased burden on tax dollars, and distraction from agency assignments. The court
in Exxon acknowledged the government's concern "that its employee resources not be commandeered
into service by private litigants to the detriment of the smooth functioning of government operations,"
but also articulated that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provided enough checks to guard against
abuse or excessive burden. Id.
169
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is commanded to attend trial and would not incur
substantial expense.170
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45(c)(3)(B)(ii), (iii),
empowers the court to disallow the taking of a nonretained expert's testimony unless there is a showing of
substantial need and the requesting party pays
reasonable compensation. The court noted that this
provision would prevent litigants from using
government employees as tax-funded expert witnesses.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45(c)(3)(A)(iii) allows
the court to quash a subpoena that "requires disclosure
of privileged or other protected matter, if no exception
or waiver applies."171
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(2), which
requires the court (on its own motion) to limit
discovery if. (i) unreasonably cumulative or duplicative,
or can be obtained from some other source that is more
convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive; (ii) the
party seeking discovery has had ample opportunity to
obtain the information by discovery in the action; or
(iii) the proposed discovery is outside the scope of
discovery.172

In addition to the provisions of the Federal Rules, the Exxon court also
noted that the federal agencies could still articulate any legitimate claims of
privilege. For example, the "state secrets privilege," which allows the
government a privilege against revealing military secrets.173 Additionally, the
government has the option to assert a qualified executive privilege that
weighs the value of disclosure against the competing need for government
secrecy. In making a determination of executive privilege, the court must
weigh "the policy of free and open discovery juxtaposed to the need for
170FED. R. CIV. P. 45(c)(3)(A)(ii).
71 FED. R. CIV. P. 45(c)(3)(B)(ii)-(iii).
172FED. R. CIV. P. 45(c)(3)(A)(iii).
173 United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 6 (1953). The government's privilege not to reveal military
secrets dates back to the English common law and seems well-grounded. In asserting it, the court
determines whether the circumstances are appropriate for the claim ofprivilege yet must do so "without
forcing a disclosure of the very thing the privilege is designed to protect." Id. at 8.
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secrecy to insure candid expression of opinions by government employees
in the formulation of government policy."174
In sum, the Ninth Circuit's decision in Exxon establishes a doctrine by
which the Federal Housekeeping Statute does not allow federal agencies to
withhold information from the public during third-party litigation; rather,
the normal application of Federal Rule 45 is assumed to appropriately
balance the interests of the government in efficiency or secrecy and the
interests of the parties in achieving evidence needed to argue their
position.75 Such an approach requires the judge hearing the matter to
protect the "unique interests" of the government in such situations. 176 This
approach is vastly different from the deferential APA analysis conducted by
the Fourth Circuit.
The D.C. Circuit largely adopted the Ninth Circuit approach,77
rejecting the opportunity to review an agency's noncompliance with a
subpoena through the lens of the APA, and instead utilizing the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. In Watts v. SECQ78 the D.C. Circuit considered a
case in which a defendant to an underlying shareholder's suit served
testimonial subpoenas on Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
employees.79 The SEC refused to allow the employees to testify under
relevant Touhy regulations that required employees to decline subpoenas
unless the SEC's General Counsel gave permission for "non-expert, nonprivileged, factual ... testimony."180 The defendant sought review of the
SEC's refusal directly in the circuit court under a statutory provision
allowing for court of appeals review of SEC orders.81

174 United States v. An Article of Drug, 43 F.R.D. 181, 190 (D. Del. 1967) ("Thus, when theprivilege
is claimed, it is necessary to balance interests to determine whether disclosure would be more injurious
to the consultative functions of government than non-disclosure would be to the private litigant's
defense.").
1275 Exxon Shipping Co. v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, 34 F.3d 774, 780 (9th Cir. 1994).
176

Id.

In the D.C. Circuit, a subpoena duces tecum will be reviewed under Rule 45, but a subpoena ad
testificandum will be reviewed under the APA. Houston Bus. Journal, Inc. v. Office of the Comptroller
of the Currency, U.S. Dep't of Treasury, 86 F.3d 1208, 1212 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
177

178

Watts v. SEC, 482 F.3d 501, 503 (D.C. Cir. 2007).

179

Id.

i8o 17 C.F.R. §§ 200.735-3(b)(2)(ii)-(iii) (2020).
181 Id. Specifically, the defendant sought direct appeal under 15 U.S.C. § 78y(a) (2018). That statute
specifically states that"[a] person aggrieved by a final order of the Commission entered pursuant to this
chapter may obtain review of the order in the United States Court of Appeals for the circuit in which
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The D.C. Circuit noted that the Touhy regulations utilized by the SEC
to prohibit its employees from testifying were simply to "centralize[] agency
control over agency employees."182 In the context of a third-party subpoena
issued to an agency, courts should apply Rule 45 standards, which does not
articulate a separate standard for subpoenas issued to federal agencies or
federal agency officials.1s3 The court found that the Touhy regulations "do
not relieve district courts of the responsibility to analyze privilege or undue
burden assertions under Rule 45" because such regulations are only
"relevant for internal housekeeping and determining who within the agency
184
must decide how to respond to a federal court subpoena."'
III.

THE TOUHYDOCTRINEiNAcTION

A.

The Split Gives Way to Agreement

Despite the current circuit split, there appears to be two areas on which
the circuits agree-the first being the question of a state court, or a federal
court on removal, attempting to compel a federal employee to testify
contrary to agency instructions.15 For the Fourth Circuit, such a situation
implicates the APA-a state court, or federal court with removal
jurisdiction, cannot review federal agencies' interpretation of their own
regulations, as such activity violates the APA.186

he resides or has his principal place of business, or for the District of Columbia Circuit." Id. The court
ultimately held that the SEC's decision in this case was not an order under the statute-the court looked
to the definition of an order from the APA to determine that the agency's decision not to comply with
a subpoena is an ordinary litigation decision and not an agency's "final disposition." Watts, 482 F.3d at
506.
182

Id. at 507.

see also Houston Bus. Journal, Inc. v. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, U.S. Dep't
of Treasury, 86 F.3d 1208, 1212 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
ia4 Watts, 482 F.3d at 508-09; see also Comm. for Nuclear Responsibility, Inc. v. Seaborg, 463 F.2d
788, 793 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (noting that the Federal Housekeeping Statute "does not confer a privilege").
18s Houston Bus. Journal,Inc., 86 F.3d 1208; Edwards v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 43 F.3d 312 (7th Cir.
1994); Gomez v. Gates (In re Boeh), 25 F.3d 761 (9th Cir. 1994); Louisiana v. Sparks, 978 F.2d 226 (5th
Cir. 1992); Reynolds Metals Co. v. Crowther, 572 F. Supp. 288, 290-91 (D. Mass. 1982).
183 Id.;

18 Boron Oil Co. v. Downie, 873 F.2d 67, 71 (4th Cir. 1989); see 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2020) (noting a
provision of the APA which expressly limits such review authority to the federal courts). Boron found
that such an approach protected federal supremacy in two ways:
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However, even the Ninth Circuit would agree that a state court cannot
access federal records due to considerations of sovereign immunity. An
example comes from In re Elko County Grand Jury.187 In Elko, a Nevada
grand jury issued a subpoena to a Forest Service employee, who was ordered
by his agency not to testify under its Touhy regulations.188 The Nevada court

ruled that the grand jury could validly subpoena the Forest Service
employee, and the DOJ removed the case to federal court. 89 There was no
question as to the language of the relevant Touhy regulations-they
specifically prohibited an employee from providing testimony in judicial
proceedings without permission of the relevant agency official.'90 The Ninth
Circuit noted that because the case was removed based on federal removal
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1442,191 any jurisdiction acquired by the
federal court was derivative. 192

The court noted that the relevant question was not whether the agency
had followed its regulations or whether those regulations were valid; rather,
the relevant question was one of sovereign immunity.193 A line of circuit
court precedent already held that in federal court removal proceedings state
court subpoenas of unwilling federal officers are barred by sovereign
immunity; indeed, the agency's decision not to allow the employee's
testimony under its Touhy regulations was a clear refusal to waive sovereign
immunity. 194 These courts have held that state courts, or federal courts on

(1) by applying the doctrine of sovereign immunity to preclude state courts, or a federal
court on removal, from reviewing federal agency action, and (2) by giving recognition to the
principle that valid federal regulations have the force and effect of federal law, which state
courts are bound to follow.
Smith v. Cromer, 159 F.3d 875, 880 (4th Cir. 1998) (describing the holding in Boron).
187

In re Elko Cty. Grand Jury, 109 F.3d 554 (9th Cir. 1997).

188Id. at 555.

,89 Id. (noting that the district court quashed the subpoena and refused to remand the case to the
Nevada court).
1907C.F.R. § 1.212 (2020).
191 In re Elko Cty. GrandJury, 109 F.3d at 555. Specifically, § 1442(a), which states that a state court
action directed to "any agency [of the United States] or any officer (or any person acting under that
officer) of the United States or of any agency thereof, in an official or individual capacity, for or relating
to any act under color of such office" could be removed to the district court of the United States for the
district and division of the place where the state court action was pending. 28 U.S.C. § 1442 (2018).
192

In re Elko Cty. GrandJury, 109 F.3d at 555.

193Id. at 556.
194

Id.
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removal, simply lacked the jurisdiction to "enforce a subpoena against an
such, the Touhy doctrine takes on a
unwilling sovereign" I95-as
jurisdictional quality.196 Further, this means that the circuit split is at a less
harsh angle than might be imagined. Circuits favoring one approach or the
other would still agree that there is no ability of a state court or federal court
on removal to subpoena a federal official; as such, the only disagreement
remains as to the power of the federal court to summon a federal official.197
The option for the requesting party is limited by its jurisdiction-in
state court, the federal officials are protected by sovereign immunity and the
state court (or a federal court on removal) cannot enforce a subpoena, while
in federal court (with federal jurisdiction) the agency's decision not to
produce officers or documents is assessed through either prong of the
current circuit split.198 However, it is worth noting that state court litigants
seeking information from a federal agency are not totally out of luck, no
matter the circuit court. Such a litigant would first request the needed
documents from the federal agency by following the Touhy regulations;
essentially, making a "Touhy request."199 For example, the DOJ's Touhy
regulations state that if a party is requesting the testimony of a DOJ
employee, that requesting party must provide a summary of the testimony
sought and its relevance to the appropriate U.S. attorney.20 0 If, after
reviewing the Touhy request, the agency refuses to produce, the requesting
party can file a collateral action seeking review under the APA,201 or possibly
202
pursue a mandamus action against the head of the agency.

195Edwards v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 43 F.3d 312, 317 (7th Cir. 1994).

196Swett v. Schenk, 792 F.2d 1447, 1452 (9th Cir. 1986) (stating that "the Touhy doctrine is
jurisdictional and precludes a contempt action" when a state court attempts to subpoena a federal
official).
197Exxon Shipping Co. v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, 34 F.3d 774, 778 (9th Cir. 1994) (claiming that
nothing "authorizes agency heads to withhold documents or testimony from federal courts").
198Agility Pub. Warehousing Co. K.S.C.P. v. U.S. Dep't of Def., 246 F. Supp. 3d 34, 41 (D.D.C. 2017).
iso Houston Bus. Journal, Inc. v. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, U.S. Dep't of Treasury,
86 F.3d 1208, 1212 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
200 28 C.F.R. § 16.22 (2020).
201 Gomez v. Gates (In re Boeh), 25 F.3d 761,767 (9th Cir. 1994); see also McClure v. United States,
54 F.3d 785 (9th Cir. 1995) (unpublished table decision) ("Alternatively, [plaintiff] might have filed a
separate action under the [APA] or sought a writ of mandamus to compel the Attorney General or her
designee to grant permission to [the agency employee] to comply with the subpoena.").
202Id. For those tempted to try a mandamus action, the First Circuit put a quick stop to such an
attempt in Giza v. Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, 628 F.2d 748, 752 (1st Cir. 1980).
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The second item on which the split circuits agree is less surprisingthat the existence of Touhy regulations does not create an independent
privilege to be exercised by the executive branch.203 Such agreement stems
from a holding of the Supreme Court on the matter. In Chrysler,the Court
considered a case involving a government contractor who sued in order to
prevent it from having to disclose information it had supplied to the Defense
Logistics Agency about its employment of women and minorities.204 Such
disclosure had been made as the result of executive orders that required the
Secretary of Labor to ensure government contractors were providing equal
employment opportunities.205 Chrysler Corporation (Chrysler), the
government contractor at issue in this suit, had been informed that third
parties made a Freedom of Information Act request for reports Chrysler had
filed to comply with the government's regulations, and Chrysler filed suit
seeking to enjoin disclosure.206 In the litigation, the respondents, who were
seeking Chrysler's employment reports, argued that the Housekeeping
Statute provided an explicit grant of legislative authority for the Department
of Labor's regulations requiring diversity in employment reporting.207

Pursuant to Giza, a doctor who worked for the FDA received a subpoena from a state court litigant in
a wrongful death suit. Id. The court determined that there was no mandamus jurisdiction because the
doctor did not owe a duty to the state court litigants to submit to a deposition. Id. The Sixth Circuit has
indicated that mandamus may not be appropriate because the ability to make a Touhy request belies a
party's argument under the mandamus framework that there is no other adequate remedy available.
Rimmer v. Holder, 700 F.3d 246,264 (6th Cir. 2012); see also Norton v. Loether, No. CV 5:17-351-DCR,
2018 WL 1352152, at *5 (E.D. Ky. Mar. 15, 2018).
203 Lively, supra note 155 ("As the legislative history accompanying the 1958 amendment to the
housekeeping statute shows, Congress intended that the statute itself should not double as a form of
privilege."). Of course, one should never be surprised to find opinions outside the party line. United
States v. Vander Luitgaren, No. 6:07-cr-211 -Orl-22DAB, 2008 WL 2610465, at *3 (M.D. Fla. June 30,
2008) ("The Court also grants the United States' Motion to Quash on the basis of Touhy."); see also
United States v. Mintz, No. 91-40045-01-DES, 1996 WL 666784, at *1(D. Kan. Mar. 15, 1996).
204 Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281,285 (1979).
205 Justice Rehnquist, who wrote the opinion for the Court, noted in his opening sentence that "[t]he
expanding range of federal regulatory activity and growth in the Government sector of the economy
have increased federal agencies' demands for information about the activities of private individuals and
corporations." Id. at 285. Against this backdrop are Executive Orders 11246 and 11375, under which
the Department of Labor's Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs has promulgated
regulations that require government contractors to report information about the racial and gender
composition of their workforces and their actions in increasing diversity in their employee pools. Id.
20

Id.

207

Id. at 281.
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In analyzing this issue, the Supreme Court was firm that the
Housekeeping Statute did not provide "substantive rules" that would
regulate the disclosure of government information. Instead, the Court held
that the Housekeeping Statute was a rule of agency organization or
practice-it did not grant any independent authority to an agency to
withhold information from the public.208 Simply put, the Housekeeping
Statute was "a grant of authority to the agency to regulate its own affairs."209
As a result of Chrysler, courts recognized that the Housekeeping Statue
could not provide independent authority for the government to withhold
information, and therefore did not support an executive privilege to decline
to answer a third-party subpoena.10 Thus, there is no absolute immunity for
an agency to refuse to answer a third-party subpoena.211 However, what
remains clear in all these cases is the basic premise of Touhy-"the longestablished rule that a superior government official [can] withdraw from his
subordinates the power to release government documents"-remains
intact.212 The split remains, of course, on how a federal judge should review
13
that decision in a federal court.
208Id. at 309. The case referenced the 1958 amendment to the statute, discussed above, as a reason
for holding that the statute did not grant independent power nor allow for withholding of information
from the public.
209Important for the Chrysler case was the "logical corollary" to this position-that the
Housekeeping Statute was not a substantive grant for the agency to promulgate rules authorizing the
release of trade secrets (at issue in the suit). Id. at 309-10.
210See, e.g., Exxon Shipping Co. v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, 34 F.3d 774, 777 (9th Cir. 1994); Harvey
Aluminum (Inc.) v. NLRB, 335 F.2d 749, 755 (9th Cir. 1964); NLRB v. Capitol Fish Co., 294 F.2d 868,
875 (5th Cir. 1961); Puerto Rico v. United States, 490 F.3d 50, 61 (1st Cir. 2007); Owings v. Hunt &
Henriques, 673 F. Supp. 2d 1104, 1107 (E.D. Cal. 2009); Res. Invs., Inc. v. United States, 93 Fed. Cl.373,
380-81 (2010); FTC v. Timeshare Mega Media & Mktg. Grp., Inc., No. 10-62000-CIV, 2011 WL
6102676, at*3 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 7,2011) ("Touhy regulations create no privilege."). For the Fourth Circuit's
take, see Kasi v. Angelone, 300 F.3d 487, 503 (4th Cir. 2002) (describing the issue as one of sovereign
immunity rather than an independent privilege). Agencies themselves also seem to recognize this fact.
See generally Beckett v. Serpas, No. 12-910, 2013 WL 796067, at *3 (E.D. La. Mar. 4, 2013) ("The
Department concedes that its Touhy regulations do not create any substantive right, such as a privilege,
to decline to comply with [the] subpoena.").
2n Comm. for Nuclear Responsibility, Inc. v. Seaborg, 463 F.2d 788, 792 (D.C. Cir. 1971) ("In our
view, this claim of absolute immunity for documents in possession of an executive department or

agency, upon the bald assertion of its head, is not sound law.").
212Smith v. C.R.C. Builders Co., 626 F. Supp. 12, 14 (D. Colo. 1983).
213Serpas describes the circuit split as such:
The Fourth and Eleventh Circuits review the agency's decision under the APA's arbitrary
and capricious standard because the APA contains the waiver of sovereign immunity that
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DistrictCourtApplication-NotNearly So Divided

In the wake of the circuit split, or confusion,214 regarding the proper
judicial standard for when a private litigant causes a federal court to issue a
subpoena to a non-party federal employee, the district courts have been left
to sift through the tattered remains of sovereign immunity and Touhy.215
"Some district courts, lacking guidance from their own circuit court of
appeal, have adopted one or the other standard used in other circuits."216 For
example, in Palmerv. Hawkins, the Western District of Louisiana noted that
it was not "persuaded that the Fifth Circuit has made any clear choice on the
issue, but it is persuaded that the courts that have applied the APA standard
have the better argument."217 In In re Packaged Ice Antitrust Litigation, the
Eastern District of Michigan noted that the Sixth Circuit's position on the
split was unclear, but that it would apply Federal Rule 45.218 The Eastern
District of New York, in Solomon v. Nassau County, applied both the
arbitrary and capricious standard and the standard contained in Federal
Rule 45219 after the Second Circuit initially adopted the arbitrary and
capricious standard and then vacated its decision to reserve the question for
the future.20
allows review of the decision at all ....
On the other hand, the D.C. and Ninth Circuits
conduct an analysis under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45, balancing the interests
favoring disclosure against the interests asserted against disclosure.
Serpas,2013 WL 796067, at *7 (citations omitted).
214 Id. (showing "[r]ecent district court cases have examined the case law and acknowledged that
there is a split of authority among the appeal courts that have considered the issue" of the proper
standard of review when a private litigant causes the federal court to issue a subpoena to a nonparty
federal employee).
215

Id.

216

Id. at '8.

217

Palmer v. Hawkins, No. 09-mc-0019, 2009 WL 3230750, at *3 (W.D. La. Oct. 2,2009).

218 In re Packaged Ice Antitrust Litig., No. 08-MD-01952, 2011 WL 1790189, at *2 (E.D. Mich. May

10, 2011).
219 Solomon v. Nassau Cty., 274 F.R.D. 455, 460 (E.D.N.Y. 2011).
220 For the Second Circuit's Touhy flip-flop, see EPA v. GeneralElectric Co., 212 F.3d 689, 689-90
(2d Cir. 2000), amending 197 F.3d 592 (2d Cir. 1999). The Second Circuit had initially adopted the
APA's arbitrary and capricious standard of review, asking the lower court to "[o]n remand ...
review
the EPA's refusal to respond to the subpoena under the standards for review established by the APA."
Gen. Elec. Co., 197 F.3d at 599. General Electric, the party seeking government documents, requested a
rehearing. On rehearing, the Second Circuit stated that the sentence, asking the district court to
consider the question under APA standards, "which would otherwise be a holding in this case, is not to
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However, despite the confusion (and concord on certain matters),221
the same factors are generally considered by district courts facing judicial
review of an agency's decision not to comply with a third-party subpoena.
Essentially, district courts are considering the same two things, whether they
223
222
use the APA or Federal Rule 45: (1) agency money and agency time,
collectively called agency resources; and (2) agency mission. As such, the
circuit split may be a distinction without a difference, as the same factors
appear to lead to the same outcomes under either approach.
1.

Agency Resources

Regardless of whether they are applying the APA standard of review,
or the standards under Federal Rule 45, courts reviewing an agency's refusal
to answer a third-party subpoena from a federal court turn their attention to
the question of money and manpower-or, more delicately phrased, agency
resources.
A fantastic example comes from Solomon, which applied both the APA
standard and Federal Rule 45 in wake of the confusion surrounding the
Second Circuit's position. The court started by examining the issue under
the standards of the APA-"[t]he reviewing court shall.., hold unlawful
be regarded as the opinion of the Court." Gen. Elec. Co., 212 F.3d at 690. No response brief was
requested from the government, drawing a vigorous dissent. Id. at 691-92 ("Finally, in fifteen years of
service on this court, I never have served on a panel that granted rehearing and proceeded to a decision
on a substantive matter without requiring a response to the rehearing petition."); see also In re SEC ex
rel. Glotzer, 374 F.3d 184, 191-92 (2d Cir. 2004) ("[T]he question of whether APA § 706 governs courts'
review of agency non-compliance with discovery requests-a question which is, in any event, far from
settled."); Abdou v. Gurrieri, No. 05-CV-3946 (JG)(KAM), 2006 WL 2729247, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 25,
2006) ("The Second Circuit has not decided which standard of review applies in determining whether
a federal agency has properly refused to comply with a subpoena: the arbitrary and capricious standard
of the APA... or the standard set forth in Rule 45 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure . .
221

See supra Section III.A.

American musician and professor Dan Wyman so eloquently put it, "It all comes down to
money. The biggest problem is juggling the cash flow." Dan Wyman Quotes, PRIMO QUOTES,
https://www.primoquotes.com/author/dan+wyman [https://perma.cc/5FED-YFTG]. Money may be a
bald-faced way to state the problem-most courts phrase the problem as one of agency resources.
COMSAT Corp. v. Nat'l Sci. Found., 190 F.3d 269,278 (4th Cir. 1998) (noting that the agency's "choice
of whether or not to comply with a third-party subpoena is essentially a policy decision about the best
222 As

use of the agency's resources").
223 Arguments in this space look much like the conventional wisdom -"Nobody is too busy, it's just
a matter of priorities."
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and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to
be ... arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with law."224 The underlying case was an action for damages
initiated by a pre-trial inmate at Nassau County Correctional Facility in New
York-while in his jail cell, the plaintiff was bitten by a rat, exacerbating his
pre-existing post-traumatic stress disorder.225 Plaintiff attempted to
subpoena two VA employees (a psychiatrist and a social worker) for
testimony relating to his treatment for post-traumatic stress disorder.226
The VA Touhy regulations set forth a list of factors to be considered in
determining whether a VA employee would respond, by testimony or
documents, to a subpoena.227 These factors include the need to spend the
money and time of the United States for private purposes and to conserve
VA employees for conducting official duties.228 In response to the subpoena,
the VA asserted the following reasons to withhold the doctor and social
worker's testimony: (1) that the doctor and social worker had significant
patient responsibilities; (2) that the doctor oversaw other VA staff, including
medical students; and (3) that there was cumulative harm in spending the
time and money of the VA to benefit private litigants instead of serving the
nation's veteran population.229
In assessing these reasons, and the decision that flowed therefrom, the
court noted that the VA was in a better position than anyone to understand
the best use of its limited resources, including the time that the doctor and
social worker would lose from their official duties.230 The court specifically
noted the "limited resources" of the VA in caring for all veterans in the
nation-as such, allowing employees to be coopted for private litigation
would risk them being unavailable to their normal patients.231 Against these

224 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2018).
225

Solomon v. Nassau Cty., 274 F.R.D. 455, 456 (E.D.N.Y. 2011).

226

Id.

227 38 C.F.R. §§ 14.803-804 (2020).
228

Id. § 14.804.

229 Solomon, 274 F.R.D. at 459.

Id.
Id. (quoting from the VA's reply brief"[i]f VA doctors or employees were required to give
testimony for every patient they treated in unrelated civil actions, e.g., car accidents, slip and falls,
discrimination cases, or worker's compensation cases, then employees would be unable to perform
their normal, official duties" (citation omitted)).
230

231
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reasons, the court could not say that the VA's decision constituted an abuse
of discretion under the "arbitrary and capricious" standard.232
The court then turned its attention to the standard under Federal Rule
45, which focused on whether or not the subpoena created an "undue
burden."233 The court noted that "many of the factors that the VA weighed
in deciding whether to grant the Touhy request, such as the detrimental
impact on the agency, the VA employees, and other patients, are also
applicable to the Court's analysis under the Rules."234 Such analysis could
also include whether the government had a serious interest in protecting its
employees from being commandeered into private service. 235 The same
burdens on the social worker and doctor were equally compelling under
these factors.36 Further, in following the Federal Rule 26 command237 that
the undue burden be balanced against the necessity of obtaining the
information, the court noted that the plaintiff had every opportunity to
utilize an outside medical expert to testify.238 As such, the same result was
achieved under both standards.
The situation in Solomon is not unusual-cautious district courts have
found that when it comes to the question of agency allocation of resources,
the outcome as to a third-party subpoena is the same regardless of whether
the "arbitrary and capricious" or "undue burden" standard is applied.239

For similar reasoning in another case, see Bobreski v. EPA, 284 F. Supp. 2d 67, 80 (D.D.C.
2003) ("The plaintiff may not agree with EPA's assessment and its denial of the plaintiffs request. But
neither the plaintiff nor this court may substitute their judgment for that of the EPA.").
232 Id.

233 Solomon,
234

274 F.R.D. at 460.

Id.

235 Id.
236

Id.

A court must limit discovery when "the discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or
duplicative, or can be obtained from some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or
less expensive." FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(C)(i).
237

238

Id. 26(b)(1).

Quiles v. Union Pac. R.R Co., No. 8:16CV330, 2018 WL 734172, at *2 (D. Neb. Feb. 6,
e.g.,
2018), aft'd, No. 8:16CV330, 2018 WL 2148979 (D. Neb. May 10, 2018) ("In the case at hand, this Court
would reach the same result using either standard."); Estate of Williams v. City of Milwaukee, No. 16CV-869-JPS, 2017 WL 1251193, at *2 (E.D. Wis. Mar. 30, 2017) (noting that even "[t] hough it appears
the [Ninth Circuit] standard is the more modern view... the Court need not stake a claim to
either... "-the court goes on to note that the reason provided by the agency fails to satisfy "either
standard of review"); Abdou v. Gurrieri, No. 05-CV-3946 (JG)(KAM), 2006 WL 2729247, at *4
(E.D.N.Y.Sept. 25, 2006) ("The Court finds that, under either standard, the subpoena for testimony
should be quashed."); Johnson v. Bryco Arms, 226 F.R.D. 441,445 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) ("In the instant case
239 See,
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Regardless, cases look to the burden on agency time and personnel hoursincluding (1) time spent by agency employees away from other tasks;240 (2)
the time agency personnel would take to prepare to meet the requirements
of the subpoena;241 (3) any cumulative impact of allowing private litigants to
243
summon agency personnel;42 and (4) cost.

there is no need to decide what burden applies. Whatever the standard, the Magistrate Judge's decision
should be affirmed....").
240 In re Vioxx Prod. Liab. Litig., 235 F.R.D. 334, 345 (E.D. La. 2006) ("This Court does not see how
the deposition of one employee during non-working hours would cripple the FDA's ability to
function."); Boron Oil Co. v. Downie, 873 F.2d 67, 71 (4th Cir. 1989) (noting that the EPA "has a valid
and compelling interest in keeping its On-Scene Coordinators, as a class, free to conduct their official
business without the distractions of testifying in private civil actions in which the government has no
genuine interest"); Ceroni v. 4Front Engineered Sols., Inc., 793 F. Supp. 2d 1268, 1278 (D. Colo. 2011)
("The burden on USPS employees and the disruption to postal operations required for compliance with
the subpoenas is minimal. The testimonial subpoenas call for two depositions, each limited to three
hours."); Quiles, 2018 WL 734172, at *2("If agency employees were routinely permitted or compelled
to testify in private civil actions, significant loss of manpower hours would predictably result and agency
employees would be drawn from other important agency assignments." (internal quotations and
citations omitted)).
241 Beckett v. Serpas, No. 12-910, 2013 WL 796067, at *11 (E.D. La. Mar. 4, 2013) (having agency
personnel appear for a two-hour deposition will not excessively strain agency resources); City of
Ashland v. Schaefer, No. 08-3048-CL, 2008 WL 2944681, at *6(D. Or. July 31, 2008) ("[Tjhe USDA is
in the best position to determine the time and effort involved in preparing the employees for their
depositions and testimony and how that time commitment might hamper their ability to fulfill their

duties. Thus, the Court cannot find that the USDA's decision regarding the testimony's undue
interference with the employees' [duties] was unreasonable ...").
242 Davis Enters. v. EPA, 877 F.2d 1181, 1187 (3d Cir. 1989) ("Appellants' argument about the
minimal burden in this case fails to take into account the EPA's legitimate concern with the potential
cumulative effect of granting such requests.... Its concern about the effects of proliferation of
testimony by its employees is within the penumbra of reasonable judgmental decisions it may make.");
id. ("Appellants have not shown that the agency's judgment that the potential cumulative impact of
granting such requests would constitute a drain on the agency's resources is arbitrary.").
243 Id. at 1188 ("[W]e cannot say that [the agency] abused its discretion in deciding that its interest
in having the time of its employees (and therefore taxpayers' money) spent on agency business
outweighed the interests of Appellants in having the EPA reports admitted into evidence in private
litigation to which the EPA was not a party."); Benhoff v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, No. 16CV1095GPC(JLB), 2017 WL 840879, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 3, 2017) ("[Plroducing the documents would not be
an efficient use of taxpayer dollars ....
").
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Agency Mission

In addition to discussion surrounding agency resources, most courts
that analyze a court's third-party subpoena to a federal agency discuss the
impact of the subpoena on the agency's statutory mission.244 Agencies are
products of their statutory missions-the EPA must complete its mission to
safeguard human health and the environment, 45 while the VA must care for
veterans and their dependents.246 Time spent answering third-party
subpoenas, in taking time and resources away from the agency's work,
compromises the statutory mission of the agency. Additionally, part of the
agency's mission is to protect government neutrality, and guard against the
appearance of impropriety.
Courts that analyze the question of agency mission in the third-party
subpoena context are often doing so in conjunction with the APA's arbitrary
and capricious standard. This seems obvious-the deferential standard of
2 47
the APA holds the agency as the expert on its own mission and resources.
For example, in CCA of Tennessee, LLC v. Departmentof Veterans Affairs,
the court noted that taking the deposition of an agency employee who was a
specialized doctor with a heavy patient load would not contribute to the
agency's mission, and thus the decision not to allow the doctor to testify was
not arbitrary or capricious. 248 However, the question of public mission is also
considered in an undue burden analysis, with courts both quashing and
9
supporting subpoenas based on considerations of agency mission.24

e.g., Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 844 F. Supp.
770, 785 (D.D.C. 1993) (holding that HHS was rational in disallowing two researchers to give
deposition testimony as it would disrupt the advancement of public health).
245 Physicians for Soc. Responsibility v. Wheeler, 359 F. Supp. 3d 27 (D.D.C. 2019).
244 See,

See Solomon v. Nassau Cty., 274 F.R.D. 455, 459 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (noting that requested
testimony would not "assist the VA in performing its statutory duty to serve the nation's veterans").
247 For an explanation of the arbitrary and capricious standard of review, see Motor Vehicle
ManufacturersAssociation of the United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Co., 463 U.S.
29, 43 (1983); see also United States v. Mintz,No. 91-40045-01-DES, 1996 WL 666784, at *1(D. Kan.
246

Mar. 15, 1996).
248 CCA of Tennessee, LLC v. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, No. 09cv2442 WQH (CAB), 2010 WL
1734953, at *8 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 27, 2010).
249 See In re Vioxx Prod. Liab. Litig., 235 F.R.D. 334, 346 (E.D. La. 2006) ("[The] deposition would
further the objectives of the FDA and the FDCA.The objective of the FDA and FDCA is the protection
of the public. The FDA protects the public by enacting regulations governing the sale and marketing of
pharmac[e]utical products and, based upon those regulations, approving and monitoring
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Additionally, the question of agency neutrality in private disputes was
addressed in City ofAshland v. Schaefer.25o In that case, the USDA articulated
that it wished to maintain neutrality in a dispute between two outside
entities with which the USDA regularly interacted.251 The court agreed that
the USDA had no business inserting itself into an unnecessary political and
legal dispute, and it was not in the interest of the USDA to become involved
in the litigation.i52 Other cases reveal similar analyses.
3.

A Distinction Without a Difference

Overall, a vast number of cases that examine.the question of a federal
court's third-party subpoena to an administrative agency show that the same
result can be achieved under either approach, both while examining the use
of the agency's resources and the impact on the agency's statutory mission.
That certainly begs the question-how split are the circuits? Certainly,
they claim to espouse different approaches to the question of deference. The
Fourth Circuit and Eleventh Circuit approach is described as slightly more
deferential to the agency, with the Supreme Court articulating the scope of
the "arbitrary and capricious" review as "narrow."253 In contrast, the use of
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45 is seen as the more "requester-friendly"
standard.254 Perhaps this is because the court must balance the interests
served by demanding compliance with the statute against the government's
interest in quashing it-the "arbitrary and capricious" standard contains no
such explicit balancing test.255 However, many Touhy regulations do take

pharmaceutical products for sale and marketing. Any improvements deriving from such a reevaluation
would promote the protection of the public-the FDA's ultimate goal.").
250

City of Ashland v. Schaefer, No. 08-3048-CL, 2008 WL 2944681 (D. Or. July 31, 2008).

251

Id. at *6.

Id.It is worth noting that this case involved a state court attempting to subpoena a federal official.
Id. at *4.
253 See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of the United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463
U.S. 29, 43 (1983); see also Beckett v. Serpas, No. 12-910,2013 WL 796067, at *8 (E.D. La. Mar. 4,2013)
("I will apply the APA standard, which is more deferential to the Department.").
252

254 See Anwar v. Fairfield Greenwich Ltd., 297 F.R.D. 223, 226 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (noting the
"requester-friendly standard set forth in Rule 45").
255 Id. ("[T]he Court must balance the interests served by demanding compliance with the subpoena

against the interests furthered by quashing it." (internal quotations and citations omitted)).
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into account the interests of the private litigant in achieving the information,
thus incorporating similar balancing.
Ultimately, the question of the circuit split seems to be one of sovereign
immunity.256 Pursuant to the Fourth Circuit's reasoning, only the APA,
§ 702, grants the waiver of sovereign immunity that would allow a federal
court to subpoena a federal agency employee.257 As such, any review must be
conducted under the APA's arbitrary and capricious standard of review. For
the Ninth Circuit, sovereign immunity considerations exist when a state
court attempts to subpoena a federal official, but there is no such concern
when a federal court attempts to subpoena a federal official.258
Despite this difference in approach to sovereign immunity, there may
be a way to read the circuits' varying approaches in tandem. If the question
is ultimately one of how to achieve a waiver of sovereign immunity, the
answer may be obvious-the APA. Courts have articulated that a subpoena
served on a federal official in her official capacity is an action against the
United States and sovereign immunity is implicated.259 As the Second
Circuit noted,
[t]he rules governing discovery and the issuance of subpoenas
duces tecum for the production of documents by third parties
include no express waivers of the type necessary to subject the
government to compulsion in judicial proceedings to which it is
not a party. The only express waiver to be found in this regard is in
the APA.260
Courts differ on how the APA's waiver of sovereign immunity comes
to exist-some articulate that § 702's waiver of sovereign immunity is
limited by § 706's arbitrary and capricious standard of review, while other
2s6 Houston Bus. Journal, Inc. v. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, U.S. Dep't of Treasury,
86 F.3d 1208, 1211-12 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
257 Serpas, 2013 WL 796067, at *7 (describing the Fourth Circuit approach-"[only] the APA
contains the waiver of sovereign immunity that allows review of the decision at all").
258 See EPA v. Gen. Elec. Co., 197 F.3d 592, 598 (2d Cir. 1999) (identifying only a broad authority
on district courts to limit discovery and the need to preserve testimonial privilege).
259 See, e.g., COMSAT Corp. v. Nat'l Sci. Found., 190 F.3d 269,278 (4th Cir. 1999); In re Bankers Tr.
Co., 61 F.3d 465,470 (6th Cir. 1995); Exxon Shipping Co. v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, 34 F.3d 774, 778 (9th
Cir.1994); Moore v. Armour Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1194, 1197 (11th Cir. 1991); Davis Enters. v. EPA,
877 F.2d 1181, 1186 (3d Cir. 1989); In re PE Corp. Sec. Litig., No. 3:00 CV 705 CFD TPS, 2005 WL
806719, at *6-7 (D. Conn. Apr. 8, 2005).
26o

Gen. Elec. Co., 197 F.3d at 598.
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courts note that § 702 is a blanket waiver of sovereign immunity and does
not require that the arbitrary and capricious standard be used.261
Section 706 specifically notes that a reviewing court can "decide all
relevant questions of law.., and determine the meaning or applicability of
the terms of an agency action."262 In doing so, the reviewing court shall "hold
unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to
be... not in accordance with law."263 This section is usually read in
conjunction with APA § 702, which provides for a waiver of the agency's
sovereign immunity when there has been "legal wrong because of agency
action."264 However, there is no mandate that the sections be read together.265
There is a presumption that an agency action is subject to judicial review,
and only when such review is precluded by Congress do federal courts lack
jurisdiction.266 Nearly all courts agree that the Housekeeping Statute does
not preclude such review.267
The critical language in § 702 is "legal wrong because of agency
action"-in the third-party subpoena context, the law creating the "wrong"
could be Federal Rule 45.268 This same theory is used successfully in other
contexts. For example, in Pueschel v. Chao,269 the D.C. Circuit examined a
case in which plaintiff, a former federal employee, brought an action against
the Secretary of Transportation when her disability benefits were reduced by

261 Linder v. Calero-Portocarrero, 251 F.3d 178, 181 (D.C. Cir. 2001) ("Unlike the Fourth and
Second Circuits, we have never read the waiver contained in APA § 702 to be limited by APA § 706.
Nothing in the language of § 702 indicates that it applies only to actions brought under § 706, and our
decisions have never so held.").
262

5 U.S.C. § 706 (2018).

Id.
Id. § 702 ("A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or
aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review
thereof.").
263

264

265 See, e.g., Flanigan v. W. Milling, LLC, No. 1:18-mc-00024-SAB, 2018 WL 4775619, at *2 (E.D.
Cal. May 1, 2018), report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:18-mc-00024-DAD-SAB, 2018 WL
4775613 (E.D. Cal. July 18, 2018) (reading § 702 separately from § 706 and noting that in "federal court,
a litigant can seek to obtain records from a third party under Rule 45 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. The federal government has waived its sovereign immunity in federal court under the APA,
5 U.S.C. § 702," but not explaining what in § 702 allows such review).

266Wallace v. Christensen, 802 F.2d 1539, 1542 (9th Cir. 1986) (en banc).
267

See supra Part I.

ContraEPAv. Gen. Elec. Co., 212 F.3d 689,690 (2d Cir. 2000) (noting this approach, apparently
argued by General Electric in a petition for rehearing, but not adopting or discussing it).
268

269

Pueschel v. Chao, 357 F. Supp. 3d 18 (D.D.C. 2018).

2020]

TERRIBLE TOUHY

1547

the Office of Worker Compensation.270 The court was forced to discuss the
issue of sovereign immunity when plaintiff articulated a constitutional
challenge to the disability benefits determination.271 The court noted that
"[t]he [APA], however, waives the Federal Government's sovereign
immunity ... so long as the plaintiff does not seek monetary damages."272
Further, this waiver applies whether the suit was brought "under the APA or
not,"273 i.e., even if the suit were brought under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.
Finally, under § 702, a plaintiff "claiming a right to review" an agency
action must specify how that agency action has resulted in a "legal wrong."274
The APA waiver of sovereign immunity requires an agency action and a legal
wrong, defined as any invasion of a legally protected right.275 In the thirdparty subpoena context, the legally protected right is the one to compel
every man's" evidence.276
The benefits of this approach are many. First, it provides a "hook" to
achieve a waiver of sovereign immunity. It seems clear that for a federal
agency to be compelled to action by a court, state or federal, it must waive
sovereign immunity. 27 APA § 702 supplies that hook and accounts for an
explanation that courts adopting the Ninth Circuit approach have had a
hard time providing.78 Further, it removes any argument of special
treatment or misguided argument of privilege surrounding federal agencies.
Most modern courts have articulated that agencies, like all other "mortals,"

270Id. (noting that her statutory claims were under Title VII, the Americans with Disabilities Act,
and the Rehabilitation Act).
271 Id. at 27-28.
272 Id. at 28.
273 Id.

274Smith v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 888 F. Supp. 2d 945, 954 (S.D. Iowa 2012).
275Id.; Pennsylvania R.R. Co. v. Dillon, 335 F.2d 292, 294 (D.C. Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 945
(1964).
276United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950) (discussing the legal right to "every man's
evidence").
277Beckett v. Serpas, No. 12-910,2013 WL 796067, at *4 (E.D. La. Mar. 4,2013) ("A subpoena served
on a federal official acting in his official capacity is an action against the United States subject to
sovereign immunity.").
278Exxon Shipping Co. v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, 34 F.3d 774, 778 (9th Cir. 1994) (noting sovereign
immunity concerns but not explicitly stating how a waiver would apply).
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should be subject to Federal Rule 45.279 The difficulty in reconciling the case
law thus seemed to be one of sovereign immunity, only.
Finally, it seems worth noting that the district courts actually analyzing
these issues, particularly in circuits that have yet to commit to a particular
approach, do so using the same considerations of resources and mission. In
some sense, they are working backwards from factors to a standard. The
factors to be assessed are universal, and thus the only remaining question is
one of legal standard, or what words to use in articulating the rule. In the
absence of further guidance from the Supreme Court, the best approach may
be to recognize that waiver of sovereign immunity comes from the APA, but
only Federal Rule 45 supplies the statutory standard to adjudge quashing a
third-party subpoena.
CONCLUSION

From the 1950s to now, Touhy has continued to be a procedural
anomaly that serves only to confuse an unsuspecting litigant with its
complicated doctrine and needless circuit split. Such confusion arises out of
a disagreement largely over how to achieve a waiver of sovereign immunity
when a federal court subpoenas a federal officer.
This Article has attempted to reconcile that split simply-the waiver
necessary to achieve sovereign immunity is in the APA, and the standards of
§ 702 and § 706 still allow Federal Rule 45 to be applied when a court
determines whether or not to quash a third-party subpoena sent to a federal
agency.
However, such reconciliation may be largely academic. As in all things,
the circuit courts can speak, but results are achieved in the district courts
(where the rubber hits the road). It appears district courts are looking largely
to agency resources and mission when they make decisions about thirdparty subpoenas sent to federal agencies. As such, the wise litigant would
frame their Touhy arguments in light of these considerations.

279 "[Federal] officers should be subject to the same rule of law that governs other mortals." Quezada
v. Mink, No. 10-cv-00879-REB-KLM, 2010 WL 4537086, at *3 (D. Colo. Nov. 3,2010).

